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TELLING TIE VICTIM'S STORY
Mary I. Coombs*
A persistent theme in feminist work has been the complexity of sex:
both a pleasure and a danger for women.' This Article involves a related
complexity: the value and the danger of women talking about their sexual
violations. Clearly, women need to come forward with their claims of rape
and sexual harassment and assert these claims in the courtroom. Much
valuable work of the feminist community has produced the doctrinal,
evidentiary, and institutional changes that encourage women to report cases
of sexual violation and to seek legal redress. I do not wish to undermine
or impede those efforts. There is, however, a sociocultural cost to
presenting claims of sexual violation in courtrooms or similar forums, such
as the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing room, even when the woman
and her advocates win. In this Article, I want to explore those costs and
consider how to reduce them by making doctrinal changes, by exploding
cultural myths, and, particularly, by encouraging women to share their
stories of sexual violation in less risky environments.
Sexual violation actually occurs, and its victims experience it as such
in a wide variety of circumstances. The legal system, however, will not
acknowledge many of these instances. Doctrinal limitations exclude
some,2 and others, though they may fit within the legal definitions, are
*Professor of Law, University of Miami. B.A., University of Michigan, 1965; J.D., University
of Michigan, 1978. I want to thank David Abraham, Terence Anderson, Joshua Dressier, Stephen
Schulhofer and Susan Stefan for their comments; I also want to thank the women who have provided
intellectual and psychological support for this work, particularly Valerie Jonas, Lili Levi and Susan
Stefan. Thanks also to the women who organized and participated in the March 1992 conference,
New Perspectives on Women and Violence, sponsored by the Texas Journal of Women and the Law,
for which this essay was originally prepared. Finally, thanks to Howard Erlanger whose gentle
nagging, long ago, has finally borne fruit.
1. See, e.g., Kathy Peiss, Charity Girls and City Pleasures: Historical Notes on Working Class
Sexuality 1880-1920, in PowERs OF DoiR.: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 74-84 (Ann Snitow et al.
eds., 1983) (discussing the dichotomous role of sexuality as a pleasure and a hazard for working
women); PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carol S. Vance ed., 1984)
(presenting a collection of papers exploring the paradoxical nature of female sexuality from many
different points of view).
2. The universe of legally recognized sexual violations is far smaller than that of perceived
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rejected because they are inconsistent with deep cultural images of
"legitimate" stories of sexual violation. Those cultural images, or rape
myths, structure our beliefs about whether an event actually happened or
even amounts to a violation, in accordance with facts and assumptions
about the woman, the man, the relationship between them, and the context
of the event.3
The woman who brings a legal claim of sexual violation, whether of
rape or sexual harassment, wants to prevail. She and those acting on her
behalf want the story to be believed. That natural and appropriate desire
to win one's case, however, inevitably colors the way the case is presented
and heard. In an attempt to persuade the fact finder that this particular
situation should be acknowledged as a sexual violation, the story is likely
to be crafted, within the limits of the facts, to resonate rather than to clash
with the fact finder's cultural script.
The process of crafting a story that is as consistent as possible with
current understandings of what qualifies as a true story of sexual violation
leaves those understandings unchallenged. Worse, it reinforces these
sexual violations. A variety of rules operate to exclude from the law's proscriptions events that
indisputably are experienced by a woman as sexual violation. These include: (1) the limitation of
hostile environment sexual harassment claims to behavior that a reasonable person (or at least a
reasonable woman) would find harassing, rather than what the woman actually perceived as
harassing, (2) the relevance of the defendant's mental state in rape law, and (3) the traditional
marital rape exception. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
reasonable woman's perspective is appropriate in determining if the harassment is severe enough to
be actionable); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing conditions
necessary to establish a Title VII claim against an employer for a hostile work environment); People
v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572 (N.Y. 1984) ("[O]ver 40 states still retain some form of marital
exemption for rape"); People v. Draper, 104 N.Y.S.2d 703, 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951)
(overturning a rape conviction because the question of "whether the defendant was in a mental state
at the time to form an intent to commit rape" and other questions were not put to the jury); see also
SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 96-100 (1987) (discussing the mens rea requirement for rape).
A large body of feminist theoretical work has criticized legal rules for assuming the
perspective of the violator and thus failing to protect the woman. These works have led to a number
of reforms that increase the likelihood that rapists and sexual harassers will be held responsible for
their behavior. See, e.g., id. at 80-91 (discussing how rape reform statutes have attempted to expand
the definition of the crime of rape by redefining who is covered by the law, what counts as sexual
intercourse, and what makes it criminal); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SExUAL HARASSMENT o
WORKING WOMEN 6 (1979) (arguing that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, sexual harassment in employment is sex
discrimination). See generally infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
3. The general public, as well as relevant legal actors, frequently construct a set of facts around
an image of a sexually loose woman rather than a sexually predatory man. For a general discussion
of the social construction of events and persons as problems, see JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, THE
CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS 112 (1981) (describing the development and application of the
"Myth of the Killer-Drunk"); DoNiLm4N R. LosEKE, THE BATTERED WOMAN AND SHELTERS: THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WIFE ABUSE 3 (1992) (examining abuse and the battered woman as
examples of "collective representations and. . . 'schemes of interpretation' which are frameworks
for organizing and making sense of practical experience").
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cultural scripts by instantiating them in the current case. This result is
particularly problematic because of its spillover effects: for much of the
public, legal claims of rape and sexual harassment, as filtered through the
media or presented in the arresting images of Court TV4 or the televised
Thomas-Hill hearings, 5 are a primary means by which their cultural
understandings are shaped.6
Part I of this Article briefly sets out some of the current stereotypes
about what rape and sexual harassment are, and about which women are
"legitimate" victims. It then summarizes selected literature illustrating how
stories told and heard in legal settings, particularly trials, are affected by
these cultural scripts.
Part II examines the stories told and heard in the Thomas-Hill hearings
and the William Kennedy Smith rape trial. In each situation, the woman's
claim was disbelieved at the time.7 Each story was crafted in ways that
acknowledged, but did not fully confront, certain stereotypes that
undermined the claim. Patricia Bowman8 denied a sexual attraction that
might have made a jury indifferent to what she claimed William Smith did,
while Anita Hill exhibited a cool, professional ambition that many found
inconsistent with the claimed harassment. I seek to imagine alternative
stories consistent with the claimed sexual violation, yet perceived as
strategically dangerous in light of the stereotypes that frame the responses
to a witness' story.
Finally, I suggest other forums in which true stories, although
4. Court TV is a national cable network which is dedicated to live and taped coverage of
courtroom trials around the U.S.
5. I place Clarence Thomas' name first because the ultimate issue before the Senate was his
credibility, his character, his behavior, and his fitness to serve on the United States Supreme Court,
though one was hard-pressed to keep this in mind while listening to the cross-examination of Anita
Hill.
6. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
7. See Mona Charen, Waiting for the Year of the Woman to End, NEWSDAY, Oct. 28, 1992,
at 84 (asserting that at the time of the Thomas-Hill hearings, women believed Thomas, not Hill, by
a margin of almost two to one); John Donnelly, Jubilant Smith Goes Free: Not-Guilty Verdict Voted
in 77Minutes, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 12, 1991, at Al (recounting the trial and acquittal of William
Kennedy Smith); Suzanne Fields, A Belle Epoque in Politics?, WASH. TIMES, June 8, 1992, at El
(stating that the polls taken at the time of the Thomas-Hill hearings showed that the majority of
women believed Thomas, not Hill). But see also Clinton C. Collins, Jr., Gender sn't Way to Pick
a Senator, STAR TRIB., June 19, 1992, at A19 (discussing how women have rallied in response to
viewing the interrogationof Anita Hill by a panel of white males and how this movement has helped
women to win political elections in many states); Nina J. Easton, "I'm Not a Feminist But... ", L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, (Magazine), at 12 (analyzing how Anita Hill's treatment by the Senate
Judiciary Committee re-energized feminists and focused attention on women's issues).
8. Since Bowman told her story under her own name on national television after the trial, I
identify her here, although she was a nameless blue dot to the American public during the televised
trial. Prime Tune Live: Going Public (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 19, 1991) [hereinafter Going
Public] (Patricia Bowman's interview with Diane Sawyer).
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currently implausible to many people, might be told and heard. Such
stories may expand the boundaries of the cultural script, enabling fact
finders and the public at large to believe them in the future.
I. Of Stories, Myths, and Fact Finding
A. Plausibility and the Cultural Script
This Article assumes that fact finders frequently do not believe
women's true stories of sexual violation.9 The range of "credible" stories
is narrower than the range of true ones. 10 It may be a useful heuristic
device to think about the situations in which fact finders discredit women's
claims of sexual violation by dividing them into two categories: "Not
True" and "So What." In the first category is a claim that challenges the
fact finders' beliefs concerning whether this kind of man, in this kind of
9. The silencing of women's stories of sexual violation has a long, if dishonorable, history.
The literally-inclined might trace it back to the tale of Philomela, who had her tongue cut out so she
could not tell the story of her rape and who partially overcame this silencing by embedding the story
in her weaving. OVID, METAMORPHOSES 143-52 (Indiana University Press 1955) (Rolfe Humphries
trans., 1955); see Patricia K. Joplin, The Voice of the Shuttle Is Ours, in RAPE AND
REPREsENTATION 35 (Lynn A. Higgins & Brenda R. fEver eds., 1991) (providing a feminist analysis
of Philomela's tale).
When I refer to women's "true stories" I am claiming, first, that women's assertions that they
were sexually violated are almost always an accurate representation of what they felt. I thus reject
the broadest versions of postmodern feminism that seem to assume that all descriptions are linguistic
constructions with no clear linkage to material reality. See Sharon Marcus, Fighting Bodies,
Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL
385 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992) (challenging the notion that there is any simple
correspondence between an event and the victim's account of it). Second, I am asserting that, absent
the effect of rape myths, fact finders would believe a significantly larger percentage of such accounts
and would render judgments validating the woman's claim.
10. Cultural stereotypes, however, sometimes operate to enhance the credibility of stories of
sexual violation. See, e.g., DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH
156-65 (1969) (discussing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), a case arising out of the rape
conviction of nine young African American men based on what was later discovered to be the
perjured testimony of the white alleged victims); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism and the Law, 6
HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 103 (1983) (noting that charges by white women against African-American
men are readily believed). These situations are outside the scope of this Article. All feminist
reform efforts, however, must be sensitive to the risks of rape myths that make certain men more
vulnerable to erroneous disbelief. For example, African-American men accused of raping white
women may need to counter the myth that no white woman would consent to sex with an African-
American man. See Tamar Lewin, Rape and the Accuser: A Debate Still Rages on Citing Sexual
Past, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1993, at BI (discussing the case of Otis Fearon, an African-American
man, who is challenging his conviction for rape because he was not allowed to introduce evidence
of the victim's prior consensual sexual activity with other African-American men). The Fearon case
is currently being argued before the New York Court of Appeals. People v. Fearon, 582 N.Y.S.2d
450 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), leave to appeal granted, 596 N.E.2d 414 (N.Y. May 15, 1992).
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relationship, would behave in the way alleged toward this kind of woman.
Skeptical fact finders decide that he would not and then rationalize the
woman's false claim by pointing to some alleged fault in her character. In
the second category, "So What," cynical fact finders accept the truth of the
woman's assertions as to what happened but decide that these actions are
not legitimate grounds for complaint by a "woman like that." The
woman's story thus must avoid both these limits, if it is to be taken
seriously. 11 As discussed in the next Section, each credibility-limiting
category was operative, though in different combinations, in the Thomas-
Hill hearings and the Smith trial.
Under the "Not True" category, the fact finders believe the man's
story instead of the woman's. In essence, they conclude that the events did
not happen as she claims. The story she tells is radically different from
what they already "know" about the types of women who are subjected to
rape or sexual harassment, and the types of men who commit these acts.
Rapists are aggressive, uncouth, lower-class strangers, probably African-
American or Hispanic. Sexual harassers are obviously vulgar men whose
inability to control their hands or mouths is apparent to fellow workers and
to the fact finders themselves. Men do not rape women they know
personally or harass women they know professionally. Women who appear
to be sexually available were not really raped, because they must have said
"yes."
Sometimes, however, fact finders do not believe women because they
are too good. While rape by a stranger can happen to anyone, a woman's
purity can render her claim of date rape or sexual harassment problematic:
The predominant cultural image is that men do not violate women who are
demure, proper, and professional at work, or women who make clear to
a date or an acquaintance that they are not sexually available. 12  The
dangers of "Not True," then, are dual: A woman must avoid fitting too
neatly into the image of either the madonna or the whore. 13
11. The two categories are related, though imperfectly, to the dual images of woman as the
madonna or the whore. See Carolyn G. Heilbrun, The Thomas Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1569, 1573 (1992) ("Woman has ever been seen as the temptress or the virgin, either sexual
or moral, never both.").
12. See, e.g., A Clash over Worker Sex Harassment, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 22, 1981, at 13 ("For
the virtuous woman, sexual harassment is not a problem except in the rarest of cases.") (quoting
Phyllis Schlafly).
13. The problem is not simply a hypothesized fact finder's rigid application of two long dead
cultural myths. These images are still powerful. But we have also entered (and perhaps passed
through) the era of sexual liberation. Most of us carry in our heads congeries of different, often
contradictory, images of how women ought to behave and the significance of different kinds of
sexual activity. Fact finders read any woman's story against their own complex set of myths and
partial truths. Fact finders' half-unconscious beliefs about the appropriate and actual sexual
behaviors of women of different classes and ethnicities are factors in these myths. The sexual double
standard "didn't evolve into a single standard but into a thousand smaller ones." Ellen Goodman,
1993]
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If the fact finders decide that the woman's claim falls into the "Not
True" category, they then must explain why the woman made this false
accusation. Rape myths provide a variety of such explanations. The
assumption inherent in some myths is that the woman is consciously lying
to hide her sexual complicity or to harm the man. 14  Other stereotypes
are premised on an assumption that women engage in sexual fantasies and
then confuse these with the truth. 15 Distrust of women's claims of sexual
violation is built into classic Anglo-American rape law in the traditional
"Hale" instruction.16 This jury instruction, once required to be given at
the conclusion of rape trials, cautioned jurors that rape "is an accusation
easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the
party accused, tho never so innocent." 17
Under the "So What" alternative, the fact finders believe the facts of
the alleged sexual violation, but refuse to deem it "rape" or "sexual
harassment." In the most blatant cases, they agree that all the legal
elements exist, yet refuse to label it a sexual violation because they believe
the woman is an unworthy victim. Frequently, "So What" intertwines with
Sex, Consent and That Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1991, at A27.
14. See, e.g., Kathy Dobie, What the Jury Wouldn't See, VILLAOE VOIcE, Aug. 6, 1991, at
25, 30 (quoting the jury foreman who, after acquitting three St. John's University students of the
sexual assault and sodomy of a Jamaican fellow student, commented that "'hell hath no fury like a
woman scorned'").
15. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial
in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1013, 1026 (1991) (arguing that even though most
psychoanalysts discredit the myth that women engage in rape fantasies, the "myth continues to thrive
in our patriarchy"). The falsity embedded in the rape myth is not the claim that women frequently
want a man to be assertive sexually or even that women engage in token resistance. See, e.g.,
Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean
Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women's Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 874 (1988) (reporting that 39.3% of undergraduate women in a study reported
having engaged in token resistance). The myth is that significant numbers of women who engage
in such sexual gameplaying claim that they were raped. See, e.g., Note, Forcible and Statutory
Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE LJ. 55,
65-70 (1952) [hereinafter Forcible and Statutory Rape] (arguing that '[m]any women... require
as a part of preliminary 'love play' aggressive overtures by the man" and then falsely report the
encounter as rape as a result of psychologically distorted memory or malice). But see Laura
Masnerus, Sketchy Statistics: The Rape Laws Change Faster Than Perceptions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1989, §4, at 20 ("While there is ambivalence, ambiguity and the potential for unjust exaggeration
in some cases of acquaintance rape, prosecutors and rape counselors contend that it is unlikely that
a woman would float a fantasy or a lie all the way through the criminal justice system.").
16. 1 SIR MATTHEw HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (London, E. Nutt
& R. Gosling 1736) (advising caution in accepting accusations of rape as true without careful
investigation).
17. Statev. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (Official Draft 1962) (requiring that jurors be given a modified
"Hale" instruction). But see A. Thomas Morris, The Enpirical, Historical and Legal Case Against
the Cautionary Instruction: A Cal for Legislative Reform, 1988 DuKE LJ. 154 (criticizing the
"Hale" instruction).
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"Not True" in their application to "undeserving" women.
Certain assumptions about the woman's character or lifestyle may lead
the fact finders to decide that she is not truthful, that she does not deserve
the law's protection, or that they need not choose between the two
responses to her claim of violation.' 8 Consider, for example, the
conclusion that the woman was "asking for it." Does this statement mean
"she really wanted this to happen and did not mean it when she said 'no',"
or "given who she was and how she behaved, the man was entitled to act
regardless of her expressed distaste or nonconsent"?
Thus, rape myths are doubly dangerous when the woman was sexually
active or when she "misbehaved" on the occasion in question by drinking
alcohol or dressing provocatively. 19 By going out with or allowing a
perpetrator into her home, a woman "consents" to sexual conduct, which
precludes real harm and "legal" rape.2° Sexual harassment law and
18. Thus, "pure" women may be disbelieved; 'loose" women are both disbelieved and
devalued.
19. See United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542, 549-550 (10th Cir. 1991) (Seymour, J.,
concurring) (discussing the persistent cultural myths that women who have previously had consensual
sex are more likely to consent to the accused's sexual advances and are more likely to falsely accuse
men of rape); Government of Virgin Islands v. Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933, 936 (D.V.I. 1986)
(asserting that the prohibition on evidence concerning the victim's prior sexual conduct is designed
to prevent the jury from using this evidence to conclude that the victim consented to sex); cf.
Clarence Page, Date Rape: A Question of Consent, ClI. TRiB., Dec. 15, 1991, (Perspective), at 3
("[l]t can no longer be said, as once it might, that a young female who steps unchaperoned, for
example, into the... bedroom of a young male is consenting by that simple act to have sex with
her host.").
This myth occurs in its most extreme form when the rape victim is a prostitute. See Margaret
A. Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 47, 68-70 (1992) (emphasizing the need for rape victims to overcome jurors' inferences
of consent from promiscuity); Mary I. Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, ora Tale of a Text: A Feminist
Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117, 126 (1988) (describing the claim
in one criminal law textbook that forced sex with a prostitute is not rape) (citing ROLLIN M. PERKINS
& RONALD N. BoYcE, CRIMINAL LAw 205 (3rd ed. 1982)).
The efforts to enact rape shield statutes were based in large part on the fear that this myth
would make it unreasonably difficult to convict those who raped sexually active women. Such laws,
however, do not address the incommensurably more difficult problems faced by women of color.
A rape shield statute can "purify" a white woman complainant by allowing her to appear as asexual
and, therefore, credible. An African-American woman or a Latina, however, is assumed to be
sexually loose by her very appearance. Jacqueline Pope, The Clarence Thomas Confirmation: Facing
Race and Gender Issues, in COURT OF APPEAL 165, 166 (The Black Scholar ed., 1992).
20. See United States v. Kernan, 11 C.M.R. 314, 320 (A.B.R. 1953) (concerning a court
martial that was reversed because, in addition to other factors, the court found it highly unlikely that
.afn intoxicated] man . . . would rape afn intoxicated] woman acquaintance . . . without first
attempting ... to obtain her consent to intercourse"); People v. Hunt, 139 Cal. Rptr. 675, 678-79
(Cal. Ct. App. 2d 1977) (stating that it is a close question if there is sufficient evidence for rape
conviction when the woman hitchhiked and did not seek to escape after seeing pornographic pictures
on the defendant's dashboard); SuE BEssMER, THE LAWS OF RAPE 150-53 (1984) (explaining the
tendency to view rape by a boyfriend or an acquaintance as a lesser societal concern). But cf. Kit
Kinports, Evidence and Procedure for the Future: Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413,
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practice also contain elements of rape myths and, therefore, deny full
protection to certain "undeserving" women.21
These myths are not only dangerous, but also widely believed.22
One sociologist found that jurors explained their decisions to acquit with
statements such as: "'[S]he asked for it, and she got it. It's a poor man
who turns down anything for free'"; "'[S]he led him on. [She] accepted
a ride in the middle of the night'"; and "'[She] consented with her body
language. '"' 23 The response of the general public to these cultural images
439 ("Even evidence of the victim's prior sexual relationship with the accused should not invariably
be permitted.").
21. See Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) ("While 'voluntariness' in
the sense of consent is not a defense to [a sexual harassment] claim, it does not follow that a
complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining
whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is
obviously relevant."); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that there
was no Title VII violation by the defendant, despite numerous incidents of sexual harassment,
because the plaintiff was found to be less credible that the other witnesses at the trial); Halpert v.
Wetheim & Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (concluding that the
"independent, aggressive, and successful" plaintiff was not entitled to relief under Title VII, despite
defendant's admittedverbal harassment of her and his discriminationagainst her in failing to promote
her because of sex). Frequently, a woman who participates, even self-defensively, in the vulgarities
of the workplace is then denied relief on the grounds that the harassment was not "unwelcome" or
was "condoned." See Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315
(D.N.J. 1983) (finding that, although there was subjective evidence of sexual discrimination against
the defendant, the objective evidence was "more convincing" because the plaintiff had appeared to
accept the sexual banter at the workplace and even to join in it).
22. See Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 217, 229 (1980) (discussing the results of an empirical study of attitudes about rape which
confirmed that rape myths are firmly embedded in Americans' minds). Many people assume that
a woman can prevent rape if she wants to and, thus, women "ask for it" and "get what they
deserve." See generally LINDA B. BOURQUE, DEFININO RAPE (1989) (providing both a summary
of the literature and a detailed analysis of the author's own studies of attitudes towards rape among
various demographic groups).
The data consistently show that a substantial part of the population accepts rape myths as true
and uses them to process new information. Id. at 224-30; see also Eugene Borgida & Phyllis White,
Social Perception of Rape Victims: The Impact of Legal Reform, 2 LAw & HUM. BEnAv. 339 (1978)
(showing that when evidence of prior sexual history was admitted, substantial numbers of mock
jurors disbelieved a complainant even when the hypothetical facts made consent improbable); Torrey,
supra note 15, at 1026 (explaining how rape myths skew rape prosecutions in a way that is unfair
to victims and suggesting reform measures that correct jurors' misperceptions about rape).
Various studies illustrate that jurors similarly use misconceptions to refuse to label a situation
a sexual violation, even though it fits the legal definition of rape or harassment. See, e.g., HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-54 (1966) (stating that even when the law
recognizes only two issues in a forcible rape case-whether there was intercourse and whether
consent was given-juries often harshly scrutinize the victim and her behavior).
23. GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL
ASSAULT 218 (1989). Professor LaFree, in his study of the processing of rape cases in Indianapolis,
states that some of the victim's characteristics properly may be used by the jury in concluding that
her story is "Not True": "To the extent that jurors weighed such behaviors as drinking, using drugs,
and being sexually active outside of marriage as indicators of a victim's credibility, their concern
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follows gender lines to some extent,24  but there is no simple
dichotomy.25 Both men and women resist hearing and believing morally
complex stories in which "imperfect" women are violated by men who are
not monsters.
One can understand why men react as they do. It is in their gendered
interest to believe rape and sexual harassment are rare events, attributable
only to monsters: These situations have nothing to do with their own lives
and require no reexamination of their own behavior.26 Women, too, are
frequently skeptical of more nuanced claims of rape or hostile environment
sexual harassment. While the apparent pervasiveness of experiences of
sexual violation27 might make women empathetic to claims by others,28
there may be a psychological need not to identify with victims. The world
with such factors is arguably a permissible one." Id. at 227.
24. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the court must
analyze the differing perspectives of men and women toward sexual harassment because men may
not appreciate the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive from unexpected sexual
behavior); Kim L. Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095, 1108-13
(1987) (explaining gendered perceptual fault lines in understandings of rape).
25. Analyses of responses to rape myths must also consider the complex interactions between
race and gender. See generally BOURQUE, supra note 22, at 205 (analyzing the interactive effects
of race, gender, socioeconomic status, and other factors on perceptions of rape). At the time of the
Thomas-Hill hearings, for example, polls showed that a large percentage of women disbelieved Anita
Hill, although her credibility was greater among women than among men. See Margaret A.
Burnham, The Supreme Court Appointment Process and the Politics of Race and Sex, in RACE-ING
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING PowER 290, 306-07 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) [hereinafter RACE-ING
JUSTICE] (discussing the effects of Hill's testimony on Clarence Thomas' support among men and
women); cf. Gloria Borger et al., The Untold Story, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RE'., Oct. 12, 1992,
at 28 (reporting poll data showing that in 1991 69% of women believed Clarence Thomas' story).
26. See, e.g., TIMoTHY BENEKE, MEN ON RAPE 159 (1982) (noting that men in general, and
male psychiatrists in particular, "'would have us believe that rape is not really a crime of violence
but only a sexual aberration on the part of rapists which is brought on by some action of the victim.
It makes the crime easy to dismiss. It keeps your own life safe from the horror of the crime.'")
(quoting Andrea Rechtin, a sexual assault counselor and advocate).
27. See Ronet Bachman et al., The Rationality of Sexual Offending: Testing a
Deterrence/Rational Choice Conception of Sexual Assault, 26 LAw & Soc. REV. 343, 343-45 (1992)
(discussing the prevalence of sexual assault in the United States); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science V.
Myth: The Failure of Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1399, 1400-01
(1992) (citing several studies illustrating the preponderance of sexual harassment in American
society); Deborah L. Rhode, Gender, Race and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1461 n.10 (1992) (citing the findings of the United States Merit Protection
Board that between one-half and four-fifths of all women will experience sexual harassment at some
point in their working lives); see also Wendy R. Willis, Note, The Gun is Always Pointed: Sexual
Violence and Tile If of The Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO. LJ. 2197, 2199 n.21 (1992)
(noting that rape is the most underreported of all crimes).
28. One study found that, although men with a high belief in a just world evaluate rape victims
more negatively, women with a similar belief do not. The researchers suggested that with women,
empathy for and identification with the rape victim overrode their general belief that in a just world
innocent victims do not suffer. Chris L. Kleinke & Cecilia Meyer, Evaluation of Rape Victims by
Men and Women with High and Low Beliefin a Just World, 1990 PSYCHOL. WoMEN Q. 343, 350.
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is safer if injustices like rape and sexual harassment happen only to
particular kinds of women. 29  Women may believe that the claimed
violation did not occur or that the complainant brought it on herself so that
they can accordingly believe that it cannot happen to them. If the
harassment described was not egregious, then women can accept it without
becoming victims in their own eyes and those of the world.30
B. Litigation and the Construction of Plausible Stories
Inadequacies in the laws of rape and sexual harassment create gaps
between experienced violations and legal confirmation of the violations, but
even the most radical doctrinal reforms cannot entirely close those gaps.
Doctrine inevitably leaves room for the application of the rape myths of
"Not True" and "So What."
First, in rape cases, a properly instructed jury will and should acquit
if the story the woman presents does not convince the jurors that the
alleged violator is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden of proof
rule exists in all criminal trials, but imposes particular costs when it
intersects with rape myths. Insofar as juries find reason to doubt based
solely on these myths, the women most vulnerable to the myths become,
in effect, free targets for potential sexual violators. Additionally, the
public misperception that a not guilty verdict affirms the man's innocence
helps reinforce rape myths. 31
Second, doctrine itself may reflect rape and sexual harassment myths,
by assuming the male perspective. 32  In a rape case, the jury could find
29. Women desperately want to believe that they are not vulnerable to battering or rape:
Strangers jumping from bushes are unavoidable, but rare. If rape and sexual harassment are not
risks from ordinary men I know, then I am (relatively) safe. If rape or harassment only happen to
women who wear revealing clothing or take rides from strangers or use inappropriate language in
the workplace, then I can protect myself. See BOURQUE, supra note 22, at 287 (suggesting that
many women define rapists as dark alley strangers so that they can "belie[ve] that rape is a highly
unusual and extreme behavior of little relevance to their own lives"); Nancy Gibbs, When s it Rape,
TIME, June 3, 1991, at 48, 50 ("[WMomen tend to be harsh judges of one another-perhaps because
to find a defendant guilty is to entertain two grim realities: that anyone might be a rapist, and that
every woman could find herself a victim."). See generally Penelope E. Bryan, Holding Women's
Psyches Hostage: An Interpretative Analogy on the Thomas/Hill Hearings, 69 DENV. U.L. REV. 171,
192-93 & n.66 (1992) (discussing the tendency of observers to place blame upon victims and possible
explanations for this behavior).
30. Cf. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 Micit. L. REv. 1, 15-19 (1991) (analyzing women's rationalizations for not
identifying themselves as battered or victimized within their marriages).
31. See Jim Hampton, Courtroom Cameras? Sustained!, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 15, 1991, at L2
("Millions know that William Kennedy Smith is innocent, because they saw his accuser and
prosecutor fall to prove him guilty."); Marcus, supra note 9, at 387 (" [Riape trials consolidate men's
subjective accounts into objective 'norms of truth' and deprive women's subjective accounts of
cognitive value.").
32. See Jane H. Aiken, DifferentiatingSex from Sex: The Male Irresistible Impulse, 12 N.Y.U.
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the defendant not guilty because the jurors thought that the woman did not
manifest sufficient resistance; or that her fear of his threat, though genuine,
was unreasonable; or that he was reasonable, though mistaken, in thinking
she had consented. 33  In a sexual harassment case, a fact finder could
conclude that the plaintiff did not manifest unwelcomeness with sufficient
clarity or that the defendant's behavior, though offensive to the woman,
was not so severe and pervasive as to be actionable.34 Lest we think that
such biases are historical relics, daily events remind us of their continuing
effects. 35
Finally, given the seriousness of the crime of rape, a mens rea
requirement is necessary. A jury should acquit if it finds that the defendant
reasonably believed facts that negated the elements of the crime. The
various rape reform efforts, by eliminating or redefining such traditional
elements as force, resistance, and nonconsent, clearly mitigate the problems
described herein.36 It is difficult to imagine, however, a plausible reform
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357, 358 (1983-84) ("[M]ale behavior is assumed to define the norm ..
. [and] women are expected to... behave in such a way as to fit within the male norm."). But see
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1177 (1990) (discussing why the reasonable person standard may
be inappropriate in cases of sexual harassment).
33. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975) (reversing a rape conviction on
the grounds that the defendant's reasonable and bona fide belief in consent would negate mens rea);
Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (reversing a rape conviction based
upon an insufficient showing of resistance on the victim's part); People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 390 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (acquitting the defendant
in a rape case in part because of the victim's failure to resist and in part because of the vague nature
of the defendant's alleged threats); see also State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole,
J., dissenting) (claiming that a woman "may not simply say 'I was really scared,' and thereby
transform consent or mere unwillingness into submission by force"). See generally Christina B.
Whitman, Review Essay: Feminist Jurisprudence, 17 FEMINIST STUD. 493, 493-507 (1991)
(discussing legal doctrines which preclude liability for assaults based upon "reasonable" perceptions).
34. See Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (ruling that a woman must
indicate by her conduct that the sexual advances were unwelcome); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc.,
915 F.2d 777, 784 (Ist Cir. 1990) (stating that the plaintiff must show that she did not invite the
sexual advances and that she consistently resisted them); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 805 F.2d
611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that vulgar comments to the plaintiff and calendar displays of nude
women were insufficient to constitute a sexually hostile and abusive work environment); Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 3:89-0557 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 20115, at *17-18 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(dismissing a Title V11 claim because the plaintiff failed to show that she had suffered a severe
psychological injury as a result of the harassment), aff'd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1993) (No. 92-1168).
35. For instance, an Austin grand jury recently refused to indict a man for sexual assault who
entered a woman's bedroom with a knife and had sex with her because, at her request, he wore a
condom. Ross E. Milloy, Furor Over a Decision Not to Indict in a Rape Case, N.Y. TMES, Oct.
25, 1992, § 1, at 30. A subsequent grand jury did indict the alleged rapist on charges of aggravated
sexual assault and burglary, and the case is currently being litigated. State v. Valdez, No. 925263
(Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 167th Judicial Dist. of Texas, filed Oct. 27, 1992). Analogously, based
on the first grand jury's decision, it would be a gift rather than robbery if an armed robber let me
keep my family photos before making off with the remaining contents of my wallet.
36. Stephen Schulhofer has examined various reform efforts of different states. See Stephen
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that would make these aspects of the interaction, including the defendant's
perspective, wholly irrelevant.37 Thus, juries remain free to apply rape
myths, and feminists must work to eradicate them from our cultural
understandings.
Doctrine, then, is sometimes part of the problem, but politically and
morally acceptable doctrinal reform can never be more than part of the
solution. 38  We must also confront and seek to transcend the interaction
of rape myths with the litigation process.
Rape myths affect litigation processes and outcomes because litigation
is a form of storytelling. In all litigation, a claimant must design a story
to present to the fact finder. To succeed, the fact finder must believe the
story and the believed story must include all the elements of the relevant
legal standard.
I use the term "story" deliberately. As numerous observers have
recognized, fact finders look for stories, not just discrete nuggets of fact
to fit into a set of legal rules. 39 Fact finders are more likely to believe
J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 39
(1992). His analysis shows that Michigan has elaborately defined force and minimized the consent
issue, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(t) (1991), Utah has made no consent rather than force the
central element of rape, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402, 406 (1990), and Pennsylvania has
transformed consent from a necessary element to only an affirmative defense, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18 § 3107 (1992). Schulhofer, supra, at 39; see also EsTRH, supra note 2, at 84 (discussing
different statutory approaches to expanding the crime of rape by broadening the definition of force
and focusing on the attacker's use of force, rather than on the legitimacy of the victim's nonconsent);
cf. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and
the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780 (1992) (arguing that legislatures should replace
the crime of rape with a variety of new statutory offenses that would more clearly and justly define
criminal liability for culpable conduct aimed at causing others to engage in sexual acts). Even the
case that has gone the furthest in easing the state's burden of proof, by ruling that failure to protest
or resist cannot justify penetration, still places the burden of proof on the state to show that the
victim did not give permission for the sexual penetration. State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266,
1279 (NJ. 1992).
37. The impact of the mens rea requirement is mitigated if consent is defined in a concrete and
precise way. A man could rarely claim to have misunderstood a woman's nonconsent if "no means
no" or only "yes means yes.' See ESTRICH, supra note 2, at 102-03 (arguing that nonconsent should
be defined so that "no means no" and that unreasonable mistakes, regardless of how honestly
claimed, should not exculpate the perpetrator). A claim that "I thought she really meant yes, though
she said no" then becomes a mistake of law, which is of no legal significance. But see Schulhofer,
supra note 36, at 42 (arguing that a "no means no" standard "solves few problems" because it
evades the determinative issue of force and fails to account for such responses to sexual pressure as
silence and qualified acquiescence).
38. I believe that the law currently allows rapists to escape punishment far more often than it
falsely convicts, and that this imbalance is greater than that inherent in, and appropriate to, criminal
law generally. Nonetheless, false positives are not unknown and are a social and moral evil. The
legal rules must allow for acquittals and, thus, will be open to misuse through the application of rape
myths.
39. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE & JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 44-45 (1981) (offering an example of
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stories that are coherent, internally consistent, plausible, and encompass as
much of the evidence as possible. To make this judgment, "legal facts are
reconstructed as stories whose plausibility depends on understandings
drawn from experience." 40 If the lawyers do not construct an acceptable
story, jurors may create their own stories in which they reconceptualize the
evidence to fit their understandings about what is likely to have happened.
Fact finders exploit-or even create-ambiguities to make the story "fit"
their preconceptions. For example, the public translated Anita Hill's desire
for interesting work into raw careerism. 41
Preexisting social constructions limit what the fact finder will believe,
and thus, what the parties will present in all litigation.42 These
constructions are particularly problematic, however, in cases alleging
how jurors use the legal facts to create a story that explains the central legal issue); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991) (showing how jurors use the available evidence to construct stories
that fulfill as effectively as possible the criteria of coverage, uniqueness, and coherence as well as
"goodness of fit" to the legal criteria provided them). But see BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT
AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 61-88 (1988) (critiquing Bennett and Feldman for their assertion that
jurors create the stories and offering an approach that allows all the narrative interactions that occur
in the courtroom to be analyzed).
40. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 171.
41. See Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the
Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1283, 1292 (1992) ("Anita Hill told a story of ambition
that was neither careerism and a desire for power and status nor a search for security[,] . .. [b]ut
the Senate and the media overlooked her clear sense that her work was important and worthy.").
In Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624, 625 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev'd, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981),
the victim testified:
I said, "If I do what you want, will you let me go without killing me?" Because I
didn't know, at that point, what he was going to do; and I started to cry; and when I
did, he put his hands on my throat, and started lightly to choke me; and I said "If I do
what you want, will you let me go?" And he said, yes, and at that time, I proceeded
to do what he wanted me to.
Id. at 625. The judges in the case and commentators have argued whether there was a "choking,"
showing sufficient force, or merely a "heavy caress." Id. at 628; see ESTRICH, supra note 2, at 64
(arguing that in Rusk the discussion of whether there was a "light choking" or a "heavy caress"
provides an example of the difference in the way that men and women perceive force); Scheppele,
supra note 24, at 1105 (explaining how the court's description of the events as a "heavy caress"
mattered in the adjudication of the case, since it implied an absence of force). In fact, there was no
actual testimony of a "caress." Tr. at 137-39, 153, 164. The description was an invention of the
defense attorney at oral argument.
42. There is a growing body of literature on the storytelling aspects of litigation and the
intersecting effects of the demands of legal formalities and rhetorics of persuasion. See generally
DAVID R. PAPKE, NARRATIVE & THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE
LAw 62-64 (1991) (offering an overview of the use of storytelling during different phases of the
legal process); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984) (describing the role
of "stock stories" in people's perceptions and understandings of their world); Pennington & Hastie,
supra note 39, at 520 (proposing that "a central cognitive process in juror decision making is story
construction"); cf. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 148 (discussing the effect of racial
stereotypes on the credibility of stories).
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sexual violation. In any litigation, the side that can construct a plausible
story-whatever the true facts may be-is at an advantage. In rape or
sexual harassment cases, plausibility means, in large part, consistency with
gendered myths. Thus, the narratives will reflect deep, underlying cultural
understandings of sexuality and gender. Unlike the situation in, for
example, a patent or commercial contracts case, one party to a sexual
violation case is systematically favored.43 Legally crucial issues of force,
consent or offensiveness are not matters of objectively observable fact and,
therefore, are particularly susceptible to cultural preconceptions. 44
Furthermore, the demands of plausibility and narrative coherence
favor stories that are clear, simple, and consistent. Women's true stories
of acquaintance rape and hostile environment sexual harassment, however,
tend to be complex, ragged, and contradictory, reflecting both the
incoherence and contradictions of contemporary sexual mores and the
impact of the event on the complainant's capacity to remember the
43. The jurors hear the particular facts at the trial against the background of their prior beliefs
about how men and women, how particular characters, behave in particular situations. "Even as
stories unfold in the courtroom, the value of the 'facts' the court will call evidence has been
predetermined by the social mechanisms that privilege certain forms of communication." Kristin
Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of ViolenceAgainst Women in Legal Culture, 18 INT'L.
J. Soc. L. 125, 132 (1990).
A striking example of this cognitive filtering can be sen in the pseudo-Freudian Forcible and
Statutory Rape, supra note 15, at 66 ("When her behavior looks like resistance although her attitude
is one of consent, injustice may be done the man by the woman's subsequent accusation .... Often
[women's] erotic pleasures may be enhanced by, or even depend upon, an accompanying physical
struggle."). No evidence is cited for this reading of women's behavior.
44. See Schulhofer, supra note 36, at 41 ("Force and consent are not observable facts but social
constructs.... [Fiorce and consent, as interpretedby justice system officials, reflect partial, 'male'
viewpoints."); see also Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1147,
1157 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)) ("As long as
women are thought to falsely or ambiguously deny wanting sex, men may be confused regarding
consent .... 'Consent' is meaningless as long as society fails to hear or believe a woman's refusal
of sex.").
Furthermore, in both rape and sexual harassment, the claim is not established if the man
reasonably believed that he had the woman's consent or that his actions were welcome. Ambiguity
counts against the woman's story under both doctrine and the cultural rules that assume women are
required to set the ground rules for sexual encounters. See Aiken, supra note 32, at 358 (asserting
that courts hold the woman responsible for the man's behavior); see also Eloise Salholz, Sex Crimes:
Women on Trial, NEwswEEK, Dec. 16, 1991, at 22, 23 (quoting Camille Paglia, who suggests that
every date "by definition is a sexual situation. Each person is giving signals, and every signal can
be misinterpreted."). Paglia also asserts that "it's fair to blame the victim if she fails to protect
herself." Id.
Cases vary in the extent to which fact finders feel free to apply these cultural stereotypes.
Juries are most influenced by extralegal factors such as perceptions of the victim's poor moral
character or carelessness when there is relatively little corroborating evidence, e.g. physical injury,
a recovered weapon, or eyewitness testimony. See Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The
Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal Factors in Jurors' Decisions, 20 LAW & SOC'Y. REV. 423, 435
(1986) (analyzing a study which showed that jurors were more likely to use extralegal characteristics
in cases where little or no "hard" evidence was introduced).
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details.45 Finally, the effect of narrative structures on case outcomes is
of particular concern here because unsuccessful narrative structures help
reconfirm the very rape myths that make future cases hard to win.
The stories of sexual violation are ultimately women's stories, but the
story presented in a legal hearing is not a simple narrative or set of
narratives presented by the woman herself. Rather, these narratives are
subject to multiple controls by the lawyers, who highlight or obscure
various aspects of the claimants' stories. 46 In pretrial strategy sessions,
lawyers construct a story to persuade the jury that is built upon, but not a
simple reflection of, the story that the claimant brings to them. The jury
does not hear a simple, continuous narrative, but rather a story elicited and
controlled by each attorney through a series of questions.47
The cultural scripts that the jurors bring to the court indirectly
influence the stories they will be told. Expectations of how jurors are
likely to behave when presented with a particular array of facts affect the
decisions of other legal actors: police making investigative decisions,
prosecutors making charging decisions, lawyers deciding whether to file a
sexual harassment claim, and even victims deciding whether to invoke the
legal system.
For example, police may "unfound" a case-that is, decide not to go
45. See, e.g., Going Public, supra note 8 (relating that a number of jurors were troubled by
Patricia Bowman's inability to remember when and why her pantyhose had been removed).
However, rape trauma syndrome experts find such selective loss of memory quite normal.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: DSM-In-R 248 (3d rev. ed. 1987).
46. See JACKSON, supra note 39, at 76-88 (describing the process by which witnesses' stories
are embedded within the "trial story," in which lawyers are the protagonists and persuading the fact
finder is the goal). Lawyers with an agenda for social change must often confront the tension
between presenting the story best designed to win this particular case for this particular client and
using the litigation as a tool for larger purposes which the client may or may not share. See Ruth
Colker, The PracticefTheory Dilemma: Personal Reflections on the Louisiana Abortion Case, 43
HASTINGS LJ. 1195, 1201-06 (1992) (discussing the difficulties in representing different groups'
interests in an amicus brief for an abortion challenge). Such issues may arise in sexual harassment
cases, especially when the plaintiff is represented or supported by such institutional litigants as Equal
Rights Advocates or NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund; prosecutors of rape cases are less
likely to have such broad feminist agendas.
47. Al Kamen & Ruth Marcus, Experts Fault Prosecutor for Uninspired Performance in Tough
Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1991, at A22 (citing many commentators who explained the verdict
in the William Kennedy Smith case as in large part reflecting the effectiveness of the defense counsel
and the ineptness of the prosecutor).
Rape complainants also face the problem of women's different speech styles, which are often
perceived as less clear, certain, and assured, and, thus, as less "true." See, e.g., John M. Conley
et al., The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1380
(exploring the results of a study which showed that female witnesses were more likely to exhibit
"powerless" types of speech when testifying); see also Robert Garcia, Rape, Lies & Videotape, 25
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 711, 725-26 (1992) (showing how people's perceptions may be altered by the
styles women use in talking about rape).
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forward if the rape myths create skepticism about the woman's reputation
or behavior.48  The implementation of "unfounding" decisions may
obscure the effect of rape myths. For example, if a police officer is not
convinced that an event was a rape, he will include facts indicating the
"undeserving" character of the complainant in his report, but will exclude
them if he expects a prosecution to go forward.4 9 Similarly, police are
much more likely to "unfound" when the victim is uncooperative.50 At
first glance, this might seem perfectly sensible: The State's ability to prove
its case at trial often depends on the victim. This may be another example,
however, of the self-reinforcing nature of rape myths. A victim may be
unwilling to cooperate because of the poor treatment she has already
received or expects to receive from the criminal justice system."' Her
treatment, however, may reflect the beliefs of others that she is an
appropriate target for the defendant's sexual advances.
Prosecutors, too, operate in the shadow of the anticipated effects of
cultural stereotypes when deciding whether to charge the alleged offender
with the crime.5 2  Once again, decisions obscure rape myths and rape
myths obscure decisions. For example, it may seem that "nonconforming
behavior" by the victim, such as an active sexual history or drinking, only
comes up when there is reason to doubt her claimed nonconsent, since
evidence of such behavior is rarely introduced when the defense argues that
no intercourse occurred or that she mis-identified the defendant. A defense
attorney, however, may be more inclined to raise a consent defense,
whatever the facts about the encounter, when she can impugn the victim's
character. 53
48. LAFREE, supra note 23, at 74-78. Insofar as thedecision to pursue an investigation reflects
police beliefs about the potential success of a case rather than the investigators' own reactions to the
facts, "unfounding" will be reduced as rape shield statutes and changing sexual mores make it easier
to persuade a jury.
49. Id. at 76-77.
50. See, e.g., NATIONAL INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FORCIBLE
RAPE: A NATIONAL SURvEY OF THE RESPONSE By POLICE 2 (1977) (stating that 36% of police
would "unfound" a complaint based on the victim's noncooperation regardless of evidence).
51. See Wayne A. Kerstetter & Barrick Van inkle, Who Decides?: A Study of the
Complainant's Decision to Prosecute in Rape Cases, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 268 (1990)
(discussing the results of a study which found that victims are heavily influenced in their decision
to prosecute by the detective who initially questioned them).
52. See Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 193,
199 (1987-88) (book review) ("[P]rosecutors receive rewards for their conviction percentage, and
the structure creates a disincentive to pursue cases that prosecutors believe will lead to jury
acquittals.") (citing JEANNE C. MARSH ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM 101
(1982)); see also Elizabeth A. Stanko, The Impact of Victim Assessment on Prosecutor's Screening
Decisions: The Case of the New York County District Attorney's Office, 16 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 225
(1981-82) (discussing how the character and credibility of a victim can affect the strategies for
prosecution).
53. LAFREF, supra note 23, at 206 tbl. 8.2.
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Finally, the woman herself may not report a rape or bring a sexual
harassment claim in cases in which the cultural stereotypes make such a
claim implausible. A woman forced by a social companion to have sex
may not recognize the experience as rape because it does not fit the
paradigm of the stranger in the bushes; in rejecting the label "rape," she
may have no word to explain the experience. As Catharine MacKinnon
explained, "We also get many women who believe they have never been
raped, although a lot of force was involved. They mean that they were not
raped in a way that is legally provable . . . . [There was not enough
violence against them to take it beyond the category of 'sex.'" 54 Even
if the woman is certain that she was violated and that an objective
observer, applying appropriate legal rules, would concur, she may decide
not to file a rape complaint on the realistic assessment that a jury may
reject her case.55
Those who present stories publicly know that they will be tested
against the limiting paradigm of the "good girl" who is subjected to a
"real" rape or a "sleep with me or you're fired" demand. If they deviate
from these understandings, the women's stories will not be believed.
Rational women, and the lawyers advocating for their claims, will seek to
succeed within these belief structures. The individual victim wants the fact
finder to accept her version of the truth and she wants a remedy. It would
be too much to ask that she also use the litigation to help expand the
cultural understandings for future cases. 56
As much as possible, then, it becomes strategically appropriate to tell
the story in a way that avoids the stereotypes of "So What" and "Not
True." I do not mean that women lie; only that, like all protagonists
telling the stories of their own lives, they are sensitive to context and
function. Even if the objective truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth actually existed, a trial is not the setting for telling it. 57
54. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 88 (1987).
55. Many women do not report rapes, because "[they] feel embarrassed and humiliated by it
.... Women also blame [them]selves. We fear being blamed by other people, and they do blame
us." Id. at 82.
56. See Steven Brill, How the WillieSmith Show hangedAmetica, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1992,
at 3, 100 ("'The whole purpose of the trial is not to educate people.... It's to decide whether or
not [the defendant] is guilty. . . .'") (quoting the defense lawyer for William Kennedy Smith); see
also Bumiller, supra note 43, at 139-40 (noting that the call for objective evidence of sexual violation
"forces the defenders of victims' rights to resort to tactics that narrow or limit the telling of the
woman's story. The claim of objectivity may also have the effect of making it more difficult to
establish the woman's 'innocence' in more ambiguous situations where rape differs from the overt
violence of 'real rape.'"); Mahoney, supra note 41, at 1308 ("Our concessions are shaped by the
urgency of need when encountering law: ... [Liaw intersects the lives of particular individuals at
moments of crisis, when attempting to remake social expectation is too large a task.").
57. See Bumiller, supra note 43, at 133 (describing the story told at the trial by a complainant
in the Big Dan pooltable rape case: "[S]he tried to present herself in society's image of an innocent
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II. The Thomas-Hill and Smith-Bowman Stories
The stories of Anita Hill and Patricia Bowman were told and heard
through a filter of preexisting cultural scripts. Each woman had to avoid
both "Not True" and "So What" if her claim was to be believed. The
media played out these stories in a way that narrowed and made still more
tortuous the path to credibility for future women's stories.
Remember the story Anita Hill told. 58 She was a young, intelligent,
and somewhat strait-laced woman with an interesting job doing important
work. She also had to listen to her boss make repeated requests to
socialize (perhaps sexually), despite her repeated explanations that she did
not want to do so. She had to listen to him describe pornographic movies,
sexual body parts, and sexual prowess, though this made her "extremely
uncomfortable." 59  The harassment did not "happen[] every day ...
But [shel .went to work during certain periods knowing that it might
happen." 60  She later followed Clarence Thomas to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission because she liked the work, the
sexual overtures seemed to have ended, and other job options seemed
distinctly more risky or undesirable.61 Eventually, she left and accepted
a teaching job at Oral Roberts University "in large part... to escape the
pressures I felt at the EEOC due to Judge Thomas." 62
Hill sought to. maintain cordial relations with a man whom she clearly
admired in many ways and who could facilitate or impede her progress
victim rather than revealing weakness and anger. . . Faced with [the] constraints [of other
testimony], her strategy was not to reveal the 'whole' story, but to construct a narrative that she felt
would best establish her innocence.").
58. I recognize that much of the text focuses on Anita Hill as woman, thereby implicitlyerasing
the radial aspects of her story and the responses to it. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It,
Anyway? Feminist and Antiradst Appropriations ofAnita Hill, in RACE-INO JUSTICE, supra note 25,
at 402, 407 ("Anita Hill was primarily presented to the American public as simply a woman
complaining about sexual harassment."). I also recognize the literal marginalization of including
much of the racial analysis in footnotes. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN L. REV. 581, 592 (1990) (noting Catherine MacKinnon's acknowledgment
of race only in footnotes). Nonetheless, and with trepidation, I appropriate this story for my
purposes, which are predominantly about the dilemmas of gender and credibility.
59. Statement of Professor Anita F. Hill to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Oct. 11, 1991,
reprinted in COURT OF APPEAL, supra note 19, at 15, 17 [hereinafter Hill Statement].
60. Jill Smolowe, She Said, He Said, TIME, Oct. 21, 1991, at 39.
61. Professor Hill might have been able to obtain a job in the private sector again, but preferred
the kind of work she had in government to that she would have as a junior associate in a law firm.
Civil service rules would have ensured her some job at the Department of Education, but not
necessarily one with the civil rights focus that she wished to continue; in any event, staying at
Education would subject her to the then-current concern that the entire Department might be
abolished. Hill Statement, supra note 59, at 18.
62. Id. at 17-19.
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within the small community of high-powered lawyers. 63  She called him
occasionally, helped arrange for him to give a local speech, and drove him
to the airport. 64 She kept her misgivings largely to herself until urged by
Senate staffers to come forward. 65
All this seemed utterly credible, even eerily familiar, to many
professional women. But most Americans apparently did not believe
her.66 Why?
One possibility, the one the Senate Republicans purported to accept,
was that her story was simply "Not True." 67  The truth was Clarence
Thomas' counter-story that none of this behavior ever occurred. The
behavior attributed to him by Hill was described as extraordinary, vile, and
disgusting. Senator Biden in his opening statement declared that "any
person guilty of this offense [sexual harassment] is unsuited to serve...
in any position of responsibility.. .. " Other women who worked with
Thomas declared that they had never seen such behavior and asserted that
he was incapable of it.68
Anita Hill's story also seemed inconsistent with what we knew of her.
She presented herself as a decent woman and no decent woman would
tolerate such behavior. Yet she endured it without public complaint,
followed him from one job to the next, and remained on cordial terms with
someone who violated the Civil Rights Act by making what Senator
63. "My working relationship with Judge Thomas was positive," she said. Id. at 16.
64. Id. at 20; Smolowe, supra note 60, at 39. Anita Hill explained her actions by saying that
"I may have used poor judgment. . . . I did not want, early on, to bum all the bridges to the EEOC.
... Perhaps I should have taken angry or even militant steps[,] .. . [b]ut . . . the course that I
took seemed the better as well as the easier approach." Hill Statement, supra note 59, at 21.
65. She had discussed the incidents of harassment at the time with some friends. She did not
volunteer to testify during the Thomas nomination proceedings, but agreed to discuss these incidents
when directly asked to do so. See Videotape of Anita Hill testimony of Oct. 11, 1991, Tape 2 (on
file with author) [hereinafter Hill Videotape] (showing Senator Leahy questioning Hill as to why she
had not come forward earlier).
66. Later polls, and more careful analyses even at the time, showed a shift in public
attitudes-far more people believed Hill and disbelieved Thomas. Nonetheless, a substantial number
did disbelieve her, and the political perception of relative credibility allowed the Senators to confirm
Thomas' appointment. Compare the Gallup polls of October 1992 (43% of respondents believed Hill
more; 39% believed Thomas more) with October 1991 (29% believed Hill more; 48% believed
Thomas more). Gallup Polls, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Univ. of Conn., WL Poll
at *1 (October 1992), *6 (October, 1991).
67. One must also remember that this was not two stories, side by side. The stories were
elicited by examination and cross-examination, and orchestrated by others, like a trial. More
accurately, it was a "trial" in which Thomas was aggressively "represented" by the Republicans on
the committee, while the Democratic Senators were neutral at best. See Burnham, supra note 25,
299-305 (contrasting the organized and effective approach of the Republicans with the unfocused
approach of the Democrats to Thomas' confirmation hearing).
68. Hill Videotape, supra note 65, Tape 1; cf. Susan Deller Ross, Proving Sexual Harassment:
The Hurdles, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1451 (1992) (discussing "the cognitive dissonance between
the two starkly contrasting images of the ... talented leader or sexual humiliator").
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Specter referred to as "these disgusting comments." 69 As Professor
Mahoney perceptively notes, she was treated like a battered woman: Hill's
failure to leave was evidence that the abuse did not happen or was not
serious.70
Because Clarence Thomas asserted under oath that these events never
happened, 71 believing him meant accepting the "Not True" counter-story.
This required, however, an alternative explanation of Anita Hill's charges.
Among the most extraordinary moments of the hearing process were the
searches for such explanations: she suffered from delusional erotomania
and fantasized it all, 72 she was a scorned woman, she just wanted
attention, she was the perjuring dupe of special interest groups. 73
Senator Specter even argued, reminiscent of the infamous "prompt
complaint" requirement, 74 that Hill's allegations must not be true since
69. Hill Videotape, supra note 65, Tape 2 (showing Senator Specter questioning the veracity
of Hill's claims based on her continued relationship with Thomas). Her lack of emotional affect was
seen as reflecting lack of harm rather than the triumph of dignity. See Carol Sanger, The
Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (1992) (explaining that
unemotional responses like Professor Hill's, while common among rape survivors, are not effective
in rape trials).
70. Mahoney, supra note 41, at 1286-87; see also Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare
Queens, and State Minstrels: Ideological War by Narrative Means, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, supra note
25, at 323, 341-42 ("Hill's education and career trajectory discredited her because, ... unlike an
uneducated person .... Hill had options."); cf. Rhode, supra note 27, at 1465 ("If a woman does
not make a strong, contemporaneous complaint, the assumption is the harassment did not occur; if
she does make the protest, she's overreacting, strident, humorless and oversensitive."). There were
also bizarre and disingenuous attacks on her credibility, such as the suggestion that she would have
kept a contemporaneous written record of his harassing comments if they had actually occurred. Hill
Videotape, supra note 65, Tape 2.
71. Statement of Judge Clarence Thomas to the Senate Judiciary Committee, October 11, 1991,
reprinted in COURT OF APPEAL, supra note 19, at 7, 10-11.
72. See Ronald Dworkin, One Year Later, The Debate Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992,
§ 7 (Book Review), at 1, 39 (stating that the notion that Anita Hill had fantasized everything was
supported only by the "bizarre testimony of [John Doggett,] a narcissistic witness who [apparently]
... had emotional problems and needed help himself."); Smolowe, supra note 60, at 40 (discussing
John Doggett's charges that Hill was unstable and fantasized about romance).
73. See Hill Videotape, supra note 65, Tape 2 (showing Senator Heflin questioning Hill
concerning possible motives for her accusations). William Safire referred to the "legal brigade using
Ms. Hill" and asserted that Judge Thomas was "the victim of a late hit by a self-deluded person
manipulated by a conspiracy of character assassins." William Safire, The Plot to Savage Thomas,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at A19. Senator Specter exhibited a similar willingness to savage Hill
and assume both the falsity of her statements and the malice of her motives. For example, he
suggested that she was guilty of perjury because she said, "I don't know Phyllis Berry and she
doesn't know me," though the sensible explanation was that she used the word "know"
metaphorically to indicate that Berry did not know her well enough to have any information
regarding Hill's alleged sexual interest in Thomas, and was thus providing ungrounded speculation,
not fact, in her testimony. See Hill Videotape, supra note 65, Tape I (showing Specter attempting
to impeach Hill on the basis of her knowledge of Berry). See generally David B. Wilkins, Presumed
Crazy: The Structure of Argument in the HillfThomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1517 (1992)
(criticizing each of these purported explanations for Hill's charges).
74. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (requiring a rape victim
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they were so late; he buttressed his argument with the assertion that
Congress had created a special short statute of limitations for sexual
harassment cases because such charges were so difficult to defend. 75
In contrast to the Senate Republicans' reaction, much of the public's
response to Hill's charges seems to have been closer to "So What," though
Thomas' denial made this illogical.76 Many people apparently believed
that he had indeed said some or all of the things she claimed but did not
deem the situation serious enough to justify denying Thomas a Supreme
Court seat.77
In the "So What" story, Thomas' behavior had not seriously offended
Hill. She chose to tolerate discomfort for her own manipulative purposes.
If she made such a calculating choice to "listen her way to the top," Hill's
assertion now that such behavior was unwelcome and harassing was
irrelevant. 78 Alternatively, despite Hill's idiosyncratic response, Thomas'
words constituted ordinary workplace behavior which did not merit
sanctions. 79
to notify public authorities within three months of the offense in order to be able to prosecute);
ESTRICH, supra note 2, at 53-54 ("The absence of a fresh complaint created 'a strong but not a
conclusive presumption against a woman.'") (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 211 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1966) (1769)).
75. Hill Videotape, supra note 65, Tape 2. A 180-day statute oflimitationsis applicable to all
Title VII actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1992).
76. See supra note 67.
77. Here, once again, the two barriers to credibility blend. If Hill were in fact a Jezebel, then
she lied either about what happened or about her reactions to it. If she were a good woman, she
would have reacted with immediate, visible, public outrage-or her purity would have deterred the
event itself. See Nell I. Painter, Hill, Thomas and the Use of Racial Stereotype, in RAcE-INO
JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 200, 209-10 (discussing the stereotype of "Jezebel," the black woman
who instigates sex and "positively revels in sexual promiscuity").
78. Sarah E. Wright, The Anti-Black Agenda, in COURT OF APPEAL, supra note 19, at 225.
79. If the issue was whether this sexual harassment was forbidden by Title VII, this "reasonable
person" gloss on the "So What" story would be appropriate. In order to show a violation of Title
VII, a plaintiff alleging "hostile environment" sexual harassment must prove that she was: (1)
"subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other.., conduct of a sexual nature,"
(2) the "conduct is unwelcome," and (3) the "conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the ... employment." Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991). The
circuits are in conflict concerning whether the "severity and pervasiveness" should be evaluated from
the victim's or the reasonable person's perspective. Id. at 877-78 (adopting the victim's
perspective); see also Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., No. 3:89-0557 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS,
20115, at *14 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (adopting a reasonable person's perspective), aff'd, 976 F.2d 733
(6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1993) (No. 92-1168). The
Senators, however, assumed that thebehavior alleged here was severe and pervasive and would have
constituted sexual harassment if it had occurred. In any event, given Thomas' denials under oath,
whether the behavior violated Title VII was legally irrelevant.
What Anita Hill endured, however, even if sufficiently severe and pervasive to be actionable.
pales in comparison to the far more severe traumas, including far more severe harassment, that many
others experience. Some women apparently felt little sympathy for Hill's complaints because they
had survived much worse. Michael Thelwell, False, Fleeting, Perjured Carence: Yale s Brightest
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Questions of racial solidarity also colored a few reactions. Some
African-Americans believed that, even if Thomas did what Hill alleged and
ignored her reactions at the time, she was wrong to raise the issue when
it could sink the nomination: A sister should not harm a brother.80
Orlando Patterson, an African-American sociologist, provided the most
vivid version of this racial "So What" story by claiming that the language
Thomas used was just a "down-home style of courting" which Hill would
have recognized and not found offensive. Patterson claims that Hill had
"lifted a verbal style that carries only minor sanction in one subcultural
context and [threw] it in the overheated cultural arena of mainstream,
neo-Puritan America, where it incurs professional extinction."81
Patterson grossly oversimplifies by asserting a clear dichotomy
between white neo-Puritanism and an African-American cultural style that
is erotically less inhibited. He is correct that there is no one universal set
of responses to sexualized speech. He is wrong in assuming that there are
two: one white and one black. Anita Hill's claim that she was offended
seems quite plausible when one takes into account her particular cultural
roots as the thirteenth child of a rural Oklahoma Baptist family.82
Patterson's claim feeds into racial stereotypes of African-American women
as Jezebels: sexually loose and therefore sexually available. 83
and Blackest Go to Washington, in RAcE-INn JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 120, 121.
80. See, e.g., Carol M. Swain, Double Standard, Double Bind: African-American Leadership
After the Thomas Debacle, in RACE-INa JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 225 (noting that many African-
Americans felt that Anita Hill had violated a code of censorship, which mandates that African-
Americans should not criticize each other in front of whites); see also Painter, supra note 77, in
RACE-ING JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 203-04 (discussing Justice Thomas' hearing strategy and
suggesting that he cast Anita Hill in the role of "black-woman-as-traitor-to-the-race").
81. Orlando Patterson, Race, Gender, andLiberal Fallacies, 1 REcONSTRUCTION 64, 65 (1992).
82. Hill Statement, supra note 59, at 15; see also Rosemary L. Bray, Taking Sides Against
Ourselves, in COURT OF APPEAL, supra note 19, at 47, 49 (quoting Cornel West, Director of the
African-American Studies department at Princeton University, as saying, "'She [Hill] clearly is a
product of the social conservatism of a rural black Baptist community'"). The unlikelihood that
Thomas' alleged language reflected a natural cultural style for Professor Hill is apparent as one
watches her deep discomfort as the Senators force her to detail the offensive language. See Hill
Videotape, supra note 65, Tape I (showing Hill's response when Senator Biden asked her to recall,
as well as she could, Thomas' exact words). Given Hill's discomfort, it is curious that Patterson
described Thomas' language as "a way of affirming their common origins." Patterson, supra note
81, at 65.
83. See, e.g., LAFREE, supra note 23, at 219-20; Wriggins, supra note 10, at 117-23
(describing stereotypes of black women as inherently "more sexually experienced or ... likely to
consent to sex"). Racial stereotypes in the minds of whites also undermined Professor Hill. She
sought to present herself as an African-American, as an accomplished professional and as a lady:
The culture simply does not have a place where these persona can overlap. See Lubiano, supra note
70, at 340-41 (noting the fact that Hill's "'ladylike' (another word for 'middle-class') behavior [was]
read as an aberration because a black lady is either an oxymoron, or yet another indication of the
pathology of African-American culture"); Painter, supra note 77, at 205 ("Simply to comprehend
Hill's identity as a highly educated, ambitious, black female Republican imposed a burden on
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Furthermore, like all the counter-stories, Patterson's version rejects the
concrete reality of the difficult story Anita Hill told and the complex
persona she presented in favor of simple stories of good and evil.84
Anita Hill displayed extraordinary dignity and composure during the
hearings, and these qualities counted against her. They were perceived as
evidence that the sexual harassment did not happen, that she would not let
it happen, or that it could not have been serious.
A similar oversimplification of reality and preference for the clear and
consistent over the ragged and complex truth also appears in the responses
to the testimony in the William Smith rape trial. The story Patricia
Bowman told at trial is a classic acquaintance rape scenario. She went out
with a friend for the evening, met William Kennedy Smith in the
fashionable Au Bar, struck up a conversation, and gave him a ride home.
When they got to his family's home, she agreed to a tour of the grounds.
They walked down to the beach and kissed once or twice. A friendly
evening suddenly turned ugly when he pushed her to the ground, held her
down, and raped her. The jury was not convinced that Bowman's story
was true; in little over an hour, it rendered a not guilty verdict.8
5
In large part, the jury may have accepted Smith's counter-story, or at
least found it sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. The claim of rape
was "Not True." The sex was consensual; indeed, she had been the sexual
aggressor. Smith said, "If you want to know my opinion . . . my
impression was that I got picked up that night;.., things developed along
a sexual way very quickly." 86 When they went to his home, she
masturbated him on the beach, and when he later sought to leave her and
go to bed, she pulled off his towel and massaged him until they could have
sex.87 Smith testified, "[I]t wasn't my decision; it was completely
American audiences, black and white, that they were unable-at least at that very moment-to
shoulder."). While Thomas also challenged white stereotypes, he benefitted both from the
sponsorship of powerful white men and from his evocation of white guilt through the word
"lynching."
84. Nellie McKay may have best captured Anita Hill's dilemma:
Because Anita Hill is black and a woman, but fits none of the stereotypes of black
women to which most white people are accustomed[,]... [the Senators] could find no
reference point for her, and therefore she had no believability for them. That is why
some had to make her over for themselves, imposing on her other images more
comfortable for them.
Nellie McKay, Remembering Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas: What Really Happened Wzen One
Black Woman Spoke Out, in RACE-INO JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 269, 285.
85. See FLORIDA V. SMITH: A TRIAL TRAINING VIDEOTAPE, Tape 2 (American Lawyer Court
Television Video Library Service, 1992) [hereinafter SMITH VIDEOTAPEI (noting in a commentary
that it took the jury only 77 minutes to render a verdict).
86. Id. (Smith during cross-examination).
87. See id. (direct testimony of Smith).
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mutual." 88 The denial by all the occupants of the estate that they had
heard Bowman's screams under their windows that night provided further
room for doubt.89
Again, then, the alleged victim must have lied and Smith's lawyer had
an explanation. He argued that she "freaked out" when Smith called her
by the wrong name during sex and that she was hurt and angry when he
went off to bed without asking for her phone numberY0 In uncanny
echoes of the charges made against Anita Hill, he suggested that she was
a "woman scorned" or that, after she first called the police and the rape
crisis center, she saw how easy it was to get attention. 91
This "Not True/Woman Scorned" explanation was the central counter-
story in the Smith case, but the responses of the public suggest that
elements of "So What" were also operating. "She didn't really explain
why, as so devoted a mom, she was out on the town until almost dawn and
didn't call home once to check on the kid," said columnist Mike
Royko. 92 The proverbial "man in the street" had similar reactions: "I
think she knew exactly what she wais doing.. . . Maybe she's a very
insecure woman who wanted attention and notoriety."9 One man said
the verdict was "precisely what should have happened, what she deserved.
A lot of the feedback you get is that she brought it on herself. ... Most
women will tell you she was doomed since the beginning. She set herself
up." 9
4
Social constructions of the loose woman, the woman who really
wanted it, and the woman whose sexual desires are conflicted, unreliable,
or ultimately irrelevant, are very strong. The prosecution's task was still
more difficult, because Patricia Bowman's story lacked the clarity,
consistency, and completeness that fact finders demand of a complainant's
story. How can a woman persuade a jury, or the public, beyond a
reasonable doubt that she was raped when she cannot even remember when
88. Id. (Smith during cross-examination).
89. Id. In addition, expert witnesses on such esoterica as the acoustics of the Kennedy estate
and soil sampling reinforced the defense case. See Frank Cerabino & Chris Stapleton, From
Astronomy to Botany, Experts Offer Speculation, PALM BEAcH POST, Nov. 24, 1991, at Al
(discussing the "army of experts" being used by both sides in the William Kennedy Smith trial,
including an architect hired by the defense to "comment on how sound travels inside and outside the
house" and botanists to testify on plant matter found in the woman's underwear).
90. Id. (showing defense attorney using these explanations in his closing argument to show that
Bowman's charge of rape was false).
91. Compare id. with text accompanying note 73 (supporting the idea that one motive behind
the victim's allegations was a desire for attention).
92. Mike Royko, Proof That It's Not Over 7ill Verdict's In, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1991, at 3.
93. Elinor J. Brecher et al., What Would Have Been Your Verdict? South Floridians Judge
Smith Case, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 15, 1991, at J1 (quoting one woman's opinion of the case).
94. Id. (Omission in original).
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or where she took off her pantyhose?95
Furthermore, Smith did not resemble our cultural image of a rapist.
He was a handsome young doctor, regularly presented in the press with his
new puppy and boyish grin. We readily believe she had sex with
him-that "he wouldn't need to rape anyone." 96  Alternatively, his
Kennedy-esque reputation as a womanizer meant that she "asked for it"
long before the demand for intercourse was made. 97
Patricia Bowman was too irrational, too emotive, too out-of-control;
Anita Hill was too cool, too unemotional, too controlled. Neither fit
comfortably within the narrow paradigms of the "True Victim." Did they
present the best stories that could have been told? Let me be clear here.
First, no one but the parties knows exactly what occurred in each of these
cases. Second, I believe on the basis of what I saw and heard that the core
claim of sexual violation was true in each situation. However, I find
myself skeptical about certain details of each woman's story, at least as
filtered through the media, which echo aspects of preexisting cultural
scripts. In light of this, I would like to engage in an act of imagination:
to envision the actual scenarios that might have occurred between Anita
Hill and Clarence Thomas and between Patricia Bowman and William
Smith. If my imagined versions are true, then both women tailored their
stories in an effort to avoid the trappings of rape myths.
Imagine, for example, a woman subjected to the behavior Clarence
Thomas allegedly exhibited. The woman found Thomas' actions distasteful
and disgusting. She also valued her career and knew that she would
jeopardize it if she created any kind of public confrontation. So, whenever
the man acted, she tried to exhibit her discomfort, but only in small ways
like changing the topic or cutting the conversation short. She chose not to
make an issue out of the behavior even after she left the job in which he
95. See David A. Kaplan et al., The Trial You Won't See, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 16, 1991, at 18,
20 (discussing the "dissonance between the trial-you-see and the trial-you-don't"); Going Public,
supra note 7 (discussing Bowman's version of her encounter with William Smith). There was no
rape trauma expert at the Smith trial because of a procedural error by the prosecution. See generally
Toni Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and
Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395 (1985) (explaining that
rape trauma experts can provide a context in which otherwise puzzling aspects of the complainant's
behavior, including memory gaps, become explicable).
96. Christine Evans, Courtyard 'Jury' Has Own View on Trial, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 3, 1991,
at A13. Other court watchers said, "I just find it hard to believe that someone with that much
money would have to resort to rape to get what he wants" and "He probably just got carried away.
Pretty girl. You know. That's how guys are. I have sons myself." Id.
97. Not surprisingly, Camille Paglia presents this response in its most extreme form: "The girl
in the Kennedy rape case is an idiot. You go back to the Kennedy compound late at night and
you're surprised at what happens?. .. [Elveryone knows that Kennedy is spelled S-E-X .... This
is not rape." CAMILLE PAGLIA, The Rape Debate Continued, in SEX, ART AND AMERICAN CULTURE
55, 58 (1992).
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was her supervisor. She was no longer immediately at risk, yet her cordial
relationship with a high government official was a benefit she could
continue to draw on and share with her new employer. 98 If she created
an incident it would not be of any personal benefit and would have labeled
her a troublemaker. That was not her style. Finally, even when she was
urged to come forward, she was reluctant to do so without assurances that
her statement might lead to a quiet withdrawal rather than the public circus
that followed. 99
Or, imagine a woman who meets an attractive, charming scion in a
bar one night. She agrees to go home with him to see the family estate.
She is genuinely unsure about how she wants the evening to end. There
are a couple of kisses on the beach-sensual, not merely friendly. She
finds him "attractive." 100 Before she has a chance to decide if she wants
to go further, he knocks her to the ground and forces himself on her. 101
Both .of my versions of the Hill and Bowman stories seem utterly
plausible to me. And both involve male behavior that seems clearly
wrong. Yet neither, I suspect, would persuade the "reasonable man" in
the jury box. If this is the woman's authentic story, she is caught in a
double-bind: The truth evokes rape myths and thus will not get told when
the woman's primary task is to persuade and to win. But as the Thomas
and Smith incidents indicate, stories crafted to avoid the myths are risky
as well. In crafting stories for litigation, women may create confusion and
implausibility, leading fact finders to reject their claims. Nevertheless, the
unvarnished, complex truth may be the more risky option. If women agree
that the complete truth is more risky, then such stories will not get told in
trials. They will remain obscured and the cultural scripts unchallenged so
long as the primary source of those scripts is litigation stories and the
media reports that surround them.
98. At one point Senator Specter asked Hill if she had maintained such a relationship "to derive
whatever advantage [she] could?" Perhaps rebelling from the implications of raw ambition, which
is always suspect in a woman, Hill responded with a disclaimer of any such thought, saying she
wanted only to avoid retaliation, not to obtain any benefits. Hill Videotape, supra note 65, Tape
2.
99. This may be the story Anita Hill told. However, the structure of the hearings and the
manipulation of her testimony by both the Senators and the media prevented my imagined story from
reaching the majority of the public. Perhaps it would have been more credible; if I am right,
Professor Hill and her advisers thought it less credible.
100. Patricia Bowman apparently said this to the police after the incident. SMITH VIDEOTAPE,
supra note 85, Tape 2 (showing defense using this fact in closing argument to support the idea that
Bowman's account of the encounter is false).
101. In her interview of Patricia Bowman shortly after the verdict, Diane Sawyer argued that
her self-presentation as "Betty Crocker" was not credible and asked her if it weren't true that
.something amorous happened on the beach." Insistent on maintaining the same persona presented
at trial, Ms. Bowman responded, 'No, there was no consensual sex." Going Public, supra note 8.
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III. Expanding the Cultural Repertoire of Stories
The two cautionary tales presented here are not merely useful
illustrations of some larger point that might have been illustrated by any
number of examples. Both were widely publicized; both were televised
live. What the public watches and reads about such cases confirms or
changes its understanding of what counts as sexual violation, of what a
woman must be and show and do for her claim to be believed. 102 All
trials, especially highly publicized ones, become vehicles for either
expanding or silencing public debate.
If litigation and its attendant publicity, along with various sorts of
fictions, are among the primary vehicles through which we create and test
our cultural understandings of sexual violations, how does that affect the
content of those perceptions? The case selected for litigation, which is
shaped by the intersecting demands of the cultural preconditions for
credibility and the litigation process, becomes the culturally understood
paradigmatic case. Yet, the case selected for litigation is almost surely
atypical of the universe of experiences of sexual violation and even of the
smaller universe of legally actionable violations.
Why should cultural understanding derive so much from litigation
stories? Statistics, if we can believe them, show that direct experiences of
sexual violation are very common. 103  If people experience sexual
102. In the long run, the effects of the Thomas-Hill hearings are more complex. See generally
RACE-ING JUSTICE, supra note 25 (analyzing the strategy of the various participants in the hearings
and the impact on pubic perceptions of race, gender, and sexual harassment). In fact, the hearings
appear to have encouraged the filing of sexual harassment complaints. See Jill Smolowe, Anita
Hill's Legacy, TIME, Oct. 19, 1992, at 56 (stating that the number of complaints rose 50% in the
year following the hearings). But see Bryan, supra note 29, at 193 ("attributing Anita Hill's
victimization to her own behavior also promotes a false sense of security in these women.").
The hearings also served as the impetus for a great deal of the sort of individual, nonlitigative
storytelling encouraged in this Article. Inspired by Anita Hill and infuriated by others' reactions,
women told their own stories to each other and to the men in their lives. My unverified hunch is
that this process of embedding Anita Hill within a context of numerous other sexual harassment
incidents was part of the basis for the shift in opinion towards a greater belief in her claim. See
Charen, supra note 7, at 84 (presenting a change in poll results after the hearings as indicative of
belief in Anita Hill's allegations).
One of the more disturbing cultural re-inscriptions of these stories was a Harvard Law School
criminal law examination given shortly after the Smith verdict. In the exam's hypothetical, the
protagonists were Mary Smith and Willie Jones. Students were to assume a number of facts about
Mary: (1) that she went to bars regularly to pick up men and have sex with them, (2) that she went
home with Willie and joined him for a romp in the hot tub, (3) that her eventual "no" was arguably
only a resistance to sex without birth control, and (4) that her decision to prosecute was in revenge
for getting a venereal disease. Harvard Law School Examinations 126, 1990-91 (on file with
author). The exam question facilitates rape myths by altering facts of the Bowman-Smith case to
make the woman promiscuous and providing a vengeance motive for crying rape.
103. See BOURQUE, supra note 22, at 25-40 (discussing several research studies reporting
incidence and prevalence of rape); ESmICH, supra note 2, at 10-I1 ("Reporting rates of over 50
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violation, why are they so prone to believe rape myths and to think the
atypical case represents the standard pattern? There are several reasons.
First, most men do not have any direct knowledge of such
experiences.' 04 Few men have been raped; few have engaged in sexual
violations.105 At least, they do not realize that they have done so. 1°6
Second, although many women have endured experiences they perceive as
sexual violation, they often lack a context for naming and understanding
those experiences. 17
Finally, women do not talk about their experiences of sexual
violation.108 It is not simply that we do not file lawsuits and criminal
charges or speak out publicly. Frequently, we do not even tell these
stories in private. We rarely talk about them to our families, our friends,
and especially to the men in our lives. Sometimes I think the number of
men who believe no one they know has ever been subjected to sexual
violation is matched only by the number of straight people who think no
one they know is gay.109
Developing and using nonlitigation forums for women's stories of
sexual violation may begin to break the pattern in which rape myths
perpetuate themselves. Ordinary people may begin to doubt the validity
and universality of these myths when they hear stories inconsistent with
percent make rape one of the most reported crimes covered by victimizations surveys.").
104. See, e.g., BOURQUE, supra note 22, at 37-38 (citing a study that reported 10.6% of the
men surveyed reported incidents of sexual violation).
105. See id.; see also LEE MADIGAN & NANCY GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY'S
CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICHTM 9 (1991) (citing the U.S. House Select Committee on
Children, Youth, and Families (1990) which estimated that only one in twelve rape victims is a
male). It is perfectly plausible to assume that a large percentage of women have experienced various
forms of sexual violation as a consequence of the actions of a smaller number of persistently sexually
aggressive men.
106. Due to gendered perceptions, a woman can be sexually violated by a man who does not
believe he is acting wrongfully. See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 24, at 1110-11 (discussing the
divergent perceptions of men and women in the context of rape); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,
878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that women tend to have a broader perspective on what constitutes
harassment); cf. BOURQUE, supra note 22, at 59 (noting that "official statistics portray rapists as
overwhelmingly young, black, and poor [, and) psychodynamic studies portray them as mentally
diseased men with uncontrollable sexual impulses") (citations omitted).
107. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
108. "Rape remains the most under-reported of all major crimes: only 7% of all rapes are
reported to police." Willis, supra note 27, at 2199 n.21 (citing 2 Legislation to Reduce the Growing
Problem of Violent Crime Against Women: Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d. Seas. 77 (1990)).
109. This call for telling stories is akin to the call by certain gay activists and scholars for a
"coming out" that can transform cultural understandings of the group as a whole by displacing the
current images of lesbians and gay men as a distinct and deviant group. See generally Marc Fajer,
Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992) (explaining that open
discussions of lifestyle choices will help to transform cultural misperceptions about gay men and
lesbians).
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them, especially in contexts where skepticism is difficult. We can tell
stories of sexual violation in a variety of contexts: in quiet conversations
with those we know; in classroom discussions; and in published stories of
a fictional, autobiographical, or scholarly nature. Each format for
presenting these stories has its own benefits and drawbacks.
Works of fiction and popular culture can sometimes help to expand the
public's understanding of what sexual violation is and the contexts in which
it can occur. The controversies surrounding such movies as The
Accused,110  The Color Purple,1  and Thelma and Louise' 12
demonstrate that they at least succeeded in focusing attention on these
issues, 113 a precondition to changing understandings. Few other forums
have as much potential. Because such presentations are fiction, however,
those who find them inconsistent with the myths may dismiss them.
Furthermore, fiction and popular culture more often reinforce rather than
erode preconceived myths: see any soft- or hard-core pornography, or
"bodice-ripper" romance novel, and almost any MTV video or rap song,
for example. According to Carol Sanger, the mass media and best-sellers
"reflect whatever it is that ordinary readers feel most comfortable with"
and embody "the quiet encouragement of the reader's existing
values."114
Autobiographical accounts of sexual violation can also occasionally
reach a mass audience. 115 They are powerful if believed, but may lack
110. THE ACCUSED (Paramount 1988).
111. THE COLOR PURPLE (Warner Bros. 1985).
112. THELMA AND LOUISE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1991).
113. See, e.g., Mia Carter, The Strange Case of Callie Khourie: Public and Private Responses
to Thelma & Louise, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 125 (1993) (examining the largely negative critical
responses to Thelma & Louise); Elizabeth V. Spelman & Martha Minow, Outlaw Women: An Essay
on Thelma & Louise, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1281 (1992) (commenting on the intense controversy
and debate provoked by Thelma & Louise, as reflected in the significant attention the film received
from the media); Charlotte L. Allen, Frightening Messages from the Movies: "The Accused' and
'Halloween 4,' Though Wildly Different, Have Something Disturbingly in Common, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1988, (Calendar), at 3 (criticizing The Accused for its failure to depict any positive role
for masculinity and its depiction of men as entirely evil); Vernon Scott, The 58th Academy Awards'
"Color Purple" Makes BlackMen See Red, UPI, Mar. 23, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (quoting several African-American men who disparaged the film for its depiction of black
men as sex fiends who repeatedly abuse black women).
114. Carol Sanger, Seasoned to the Use, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 1338, 1343 (1989). A skillful
analyst can use almost any material to sensitively explore and challenge standard conceptions of men,
women, and sexual violation. Cf. Garcia, supra note 47 (using director Bertolucci's LAST TANGO
IN PARIS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1972) as the basis for an innovative exploration of rape trials).
Most of the public, however, engages in popular culture without the filter of a sensitive cultural
critic.
115. See, e.g., MAYA ANGELOU, I KNOW WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS 70-73 (1969)
(describing a violation that occurred during the author's childhood); LINDA LoVELACE & MIKE
MCGRADY, ORDEAL (1980) (describing coerced prostitution which included her performance in the
pornographic film Deep Throat). One striking story in the popular media, but written in a
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the credibility given to women we know or to women with the mantle of
scholarly expertise. More recently, some women have included such
autobiographical elements within more scholarly works.' 16  These
accounts are less subject to the skepticism attached to fiction, though their
potential audience is unlikely to include those most unthinkingly loyal to
the rape myths challenged therein.
Stories of sexual violation can also be told in the classroom. When
told by the faculty member, they carry the implicit legitimacy of scholars'
stories, and simultaneously allow for a conversation that may challenge and
shift preconceptions.1 1
7
Perhaps the most common, nonlitigation forum for telling stories of
sexual violation is the personal conversation. Those who know and respect
us may then believe us, even when we tell stories inconsistent with what
they thought they already knew. 118 Other women hearing our stories
may feel empowered to tell their own and to recognize that they were not
at fault.1 19
If out-of-court stories are to change beliefs of listeners, the listeners
must first believe them. Are such stories true and are the tellers credible?
dispassionate voice, is Jane Schorer, It Couldn't Happen to Me: One Woman's Story, DES MOINES
REG., Feb. 25-Mar. 1, 1990 (special reprint). It Couldn't Happen to Me won its publisher, Geneva
Overholser, a Pulitzer Prize. See Judy Mann, Women's Empowerment Wins a Pulitzer Prize, WASH.
POST, Apr. 12, 1991, at D3 (noting the recent trend among rape victims of identifying themselves
and speaking out in the media and crediting Overholser for initiating that trend).
116. Susan Estrich, followed by Lynne Henderson, opened the door to legal scholarship for
such stories. Though in each case their experience fit within the paradigm of the classic rape, they
helped counter rape myths by showing rape survivors as simultaneously strong and vulnerable. See
EsTRICH, supra note 2, at 1-3 (describing her experience of having been raped by a stranger who
subsequently stole her car); Henderson, supra note 52, at 220-24 (describing the circumstances of
her rape by a stranger who broke into her home). See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call
of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991) (discussing the uses of feminist narratives in legal
scholarship).
117. Even introducing the topic of rape in a law school classroom, or in any other classroom
setting, is not without risks. See James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and
Rewards, 102 YALE L.J. 481 (1992) (arguing that the benefits outweigh those risks). Telling, or
creating space in which students can tell, experiential stories of rape increases the stakes on both
sides of that equation but is, I believe, worthwhile. See Mary 1. Coombs, Non-Sexist Teaching
Techniques in Substantive Law Courses, 14 S. ILL. U. LJ. 507, 521-23 (1990) (asserting that,
because the law does not equally acknowledge male and female perspectives concerning rape, good
feminist classroom teaching of rape can and must be used to explore and better understand gendered
views); Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 Yale LJ. 509, 511-12 (1992) (noting the lack of
law school classroom instruction about rape, and describing how she has worked to educate students
about rape).
118. Public stories are likely to be most effective when "amplified" by the additional, personal
stories they inspire, as appeared to happen in the aftermath of the Hill-Thomas hearings. See supra
note 102.
119. See infra text accompanying note 140 (describing my experience of harassment by a senior
partner at my law firm).
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Women theoretically could tell deliberately false or misleading stories of
their own sexual violations to make a political point, but I have seen no
evidence that they have done so. I do not mean that there is a simple and
identical correspondence between stories and the underlying reality. As I
reflect on a story I have told, and will tell again, 120 I realize that the
story is inevitably crafted, if only to fit real-time events into the confines
of a usable narrative. It reflects my own perspective and understanding of
the events in question, and my memory and emotional response shift
slightly with each retelling. 12 1  Nonetheless, the story I have told is
always as honest a presentation of the events and my reactions as I could
make it at the time. Given the risks of public presentation and the lack of
any benefit to the teller other than the hoped-for contribution to others'
understanding, such honest telling should presumably be the norm.
122
Will such nonlitigation stories be believed? Admittedly, they lack the
indicia of truth-telling particular to litigation, such as the oath or cross-
examination. These devices, however, are arguably a counter to the self-
interestedness that makes us skeptical of courtroom testimony. When the
incentive to lie is gone, as in the nonlitigation setting, such devices are
unnecessary.
The listener's belief in the truth of the particular story told is not
necessarily sufficient to erode cultural understandings. 123 People may
carve out a little box for these stories, refusing the invitation to generalize.
120. See infra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
121. I do not claim that my story is "objectively true," or even a wholly accurate representation
of some unidimensional Coombsian truth. Like all stories, it is hopelessly constructed: its meaning,
even its underlying facts, change as I tell it; the purposes of the telling affect my own understanding.
Part of the meaning of the consciousness-raising process is rooted in the recognition that even
self-believed stories are not the same as truth. Historians and writers have long recognized the
intricate and shifting notions of "truth." See, e.g., James Atlas, Stranger than Fiction, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 22, 43 ("'Nonfiction is true when it is beautiful; we recognize
untruth when we see it like a bad dye job on the street.'") (quoting Mary Gordon); see also
MarianneWesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L. REv. 331,
338 (1985) ("The criterion for the 'truth' of an interpretation or explanation in [the
psychotherapist's] sense is its power to illuminate the subject's life in a way that is useful to him,
not its perfect correspondence to the past.").
122. For detailed accounts of four rape survivors' experiences, see MADIGAN & GAMBLE, supra
note 105, at 27-41; see also Kristin Bumiller, Her Word Against His, WoMEN's REv. OF BOOKS,
Jan. 1992, at 25, 26 (1992) (reviewing LEE MADIGAN & NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE:
SociErY's CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM (1991)) ("The authors don't try to make their
accounts more credible by omitting troubling complexities or messy details.").
123. In some contexts, stories must be typical of the range of possible stories before we can
legitimately expect people to base action on them. See Abrams, supra note 116, at 979 ("Even some
readers willing to believe that a narrative scholar has offered a trustworthy account of a particular
experience may doubt the 'typicality' of the experience recounted."). In this Article, however, the
stories are a challenge to false universal claims. At least insofar as its listeners do not dismiss a
given story as freakish, its existence demonstrates the falsely constricted nature of the prior,
litigation-derived paradigms.
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Or they may simply maintain concurrent, contradictory beliefs. Beliefs in
rape myths may, in some instances, serve deep psychological needs that
make them resistant to logic and contrary evidence. 124  We cannot
expect to magically transform public misconceptions about sexual violation
and its victims. New stories of violation may, however, have positive
effects at the margins, on persons whose beliefs in rape myths are
sufficiently shallow to be more readily uprooted.
Despite the potential benefits to women from the public telling of their
stories of sexual violation, there are costs as well. These costs are highest
when the stories have the greatest chance of exploding the rape myths:
when we tell them to people who know us. We cannot guarantee that our
friends will believe us or take us seriously. Negative responses can make
us angry or anxious; they can threaten relationships that matter to us. A
listener's skeptical or critical reaction can also trigger feelings of shame at
being a victim. 125 We should admire women willing to endure these
costs to tell their stories in nonlitigation forums, as we admire those willing
to endure the still harsher costs of telling stories in court. 126
One advantage of nonlitigation forums is that legal criteria do not
formally restrict these stories. Nonetheless, legal categories structure the
stories that we tell ourselves, the stories that we tell others, and the weight
those stories carry in the minds of listeners. The law-saturated character
of experiences and narratives of sexual violation is inherent in our very
vocabulary. The words "rape" and "sexual harassment" both have dual
functions: they serve simultaneously as legal conclusions and as the words
we use to describe particular experiences. 127  The lack of a distinct
124. For some men, the real motivating force for their beliefs about women's sexual availability
may be a subconscious need to dominate women, covered by a thin veneer of self-deception. See
BENEKE, supra note 26, at 15 ("[Flor many men seeking sex with a woman has more to do with
[status, hostility, control, or dominance] than with sensual pleasure or sexual satisfaction."); Willis,
supra note 27, at 2199 (asserting that men "who feel powerless in a society that defines masculinity
in terms of power and who have less access to nonphysical means of asserting their power over
women... are directly involved in rape").
125. These reactions can be seen in the stories of women who took their experiences to court.
Patricia Bowman commented during cross-examination that she was "feeling very guilty... . I was
trying to figure out what I had done to make Mr. Smith rape me." SMITH VIDEOTAPE, supra note
85, Tape 2. At one point, Anita Hill said she was "embarrassed and humiliated" by Judge Thomas'
sexualized conversations. Hill Videotape, supra note 65, Tape 1.
126. See Henderson, supra note 52, at 224:
I understand why other rape survivors find that price [of telling their stories] too high
to pay.... But we are doomed to stay in the traps of rape mythology unless we look
at what rape really is. Women and men must confront the horror, not deny it, and do
everything in their power to end it.
Id. See generally Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims'
Identities, 64 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 1020 (1991) (positing that disclosure of rape victims' identities should
be limited by state statutes that balance the interests of the media and the victim).
127. A particularly poignant example is the way in which Anita Hill used the lay meaning of
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vocabulary makes it difficult to capture an experience of sexual violation
except insofar as it conforms to the law's formal limits. 128  For
example, sexual harassment could not be understood or discussed until a
terminology made it a legal and political issue rather than a personal and
individualized dilemma. 129
Nevertheless, nonlitigation forums do allow us to move beyond current
legal understandings. Sexual harassment developed first and farthest in
consciousness-raising and only later through litigation. Nonlegal settings
are, at least, less law-drenched. Public storytelling also provides a space
for more complex, ambiguous, ragged-edged, real stories. We can use
stories of what we think were clear acts of sexual violation to clarify the
boundaries for those less knowledgeable about sexual violation and those
more inclined to accept rape myths as true; in safer spaces, we can explore
fragmentary, ambiguous, and even self-contradictory stories. 130  As
the word "harassment" in describing her experience to the press. Later in the hearings, Senator
Specter pilloried her because she refused to use the term in such contexts as the hearings or her FBI
statement, where it implied a legal conclusion dependent only in part on the acts he had done and
her reactions. Hill tried to explain that "I was not raising a legal claim.... but attempting to inform
you about certain conduct; ...you can decide if it's sexual harassment." Specter pounced: "So
you are not now drawing a conclusion that Clarence Thomas sexually harassed you?," as if in
refusing she had denied the fact of the harassing behavior. Hill Videotape, supra note 65, Tape 2.
128. The limited capacity of our language to describe the experiences of women is a staple of
feminist theorizing. See, e.g., H6lne Cixous, The Laugh of Medusa, in NEW FRIENCH FE INISMS
245, 248 (Elaine Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron eds., 1980) ("[W]ith a few rare exceptions, there
has not yet been any writing that inscribes femininity."); Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know:
Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX J. WOMEN & L. 41, 55 (1993) ("We have few
metaphors for sexual desire and passion that are not also metaphors for violence, power, and
irresponsibility."); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 81, 144 (1987) ("Women's subjective
internal pain, because it is so silent and invisible-and because it is so different-is quite literally
incomprehensible."); cf. Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnodio by Precedent and
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE LJ. 625, 629 (describing the difficulty of
explaining in traditional legal language the harms that have been done to disempowered groups such
as Native Americans).
129. See MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 27 ("Until 1976, lacking a term to express it, sexual
harassment was literally unspeakable, which made a generalized, shared, and social definition of it
inaccessible."). MacKinnon also noted, "When an outrage has been so long repressed, there will
be few social codifications for its expression. [V]ictims may initially say (and believe) that they are
not victims, so near is the denial to erasure. Women's consciousness erupts through fissures in the
socially knowable." Id. at xii.
130. See Bumiller, supra note 122, at 25:
The survivor's claim of violation is almost always invalidated by powerful cultural
fantasies that perpetuate the idea that rape is inevitable. The power of women to
narrate the story [of rape] is also suppressed by the way law and culture frame sexual
identities. Women's stories will not be believed unless they can be heard from a
perspective outside of a system of law and language that reinscribes the violence.
Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 52, at 221 ("What I am advocating is a form of cultural
'consciousness raising'.. . [which] must begin with concrete stories and breaking silence.").
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MacKinnon notes, "Personal statements direct from daily life, in which we
say more than we know, may be the primary form in which such
experiences exist in social space; at this point they may be their only
accessible form."'131
There are at least three reasons for telling stories of sexual violation.
First, current cultural [mis]understandings of sexuality and sexual violation
inhibit our capacity to comprehend the violation in cases in which the
woman clearly and unambiguously said no or made the unwelcomeness of
advances known, but was a sexual being in other contexts. In these cases,
the stories are complex, because women are complex and their sexuality in
one context is entirely consistent with their decision not to be sexually
available in another. These cases are difficult solely because of the
dichotomous stereotypes of women's sexual nature; ultimately, under the
law, they should be easy cases. They may be described as "false
ambiguities."
Second, telling stories of sexual violation increases the chances for all
honest claims to be believed; these effects in turn increase support for legal
reform. The stories provide support for substantive reform, such as
changing the legal definition of consent to something akin to "no means
no," which might turn a "So What" into a "Good Enough." 132 The
tellings may also make evidentiary limitations such as rape shield laws both
more politically acceptable and less necessary. 133
Noncourtroom contexts also allow us to tell stories of "true
ambiguities"-cases experienced as sexual violation but problematic under
existing legal doctrine. Consider, for example, a "consent" induced by
131. MACKINNO N, supra note 2, at xii.
132. ESTRICu, supra note 2, at 102-03. The proposed rule makes "no" sufficient, but not
necessary to convict; a "yes" induced by force or fraud is treated like a "no" as it is in the law of
property crimes. Some have gone beyond Estrich, proposing that intercourse is sanctionable absent
an explicit "yes." See Schulhofer, supra note 36, at 76 (suggesting that, given the seriousness of
intercourse, "nothing less than a crystallized attitude of positive willingness] should ever count as
consent"). There is similar dispute in the sexual harassment literature, with the more radical critics
proposing that any behavior that the woman finds unwelcome should be forbidden.
133. For a discussion of rape shield statutes, see Harriet Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the
State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763 (1986).
Several scholars have suggested excluding women's behavior and dress from a "welcomenesa"
inquiry in sexual harassment. E.g., Christopher P. Barton, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A
Consideration ofMeritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual Harassment, 67 B.U.
L. REv. 445, 472-73 (1987); see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(3) (West 1992) (forbidding admission
of evidence of victim's manner of dress to show consent to sexual battery); Barbara Fromm, Sexual
Battery: Mixed-Signal Legislation Reveals Need for Further Reform, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. RIv. 579
(1991) (discussing this Florida law).
Morrison Torrey's proposal to provide potential jurors in rape cases with data to counter rape
myths similarly rests on a determination that these myths are both false and pernicious. See Torrey,
supra note 15, at 1066-67 (advocating the use of expert testimony to "de-program" jurors and
counteract the jurors' acceptance of rape myths).
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fear that the man will otherwise publicly humiliate the woman with true but
embarrassing facts. Or, consider sexually appraising looks and frequent
references by a supervisor to a woman employee's physical attractiveness,
when she is too discomfited and afraid of the consequences to complain to
management. Absent such stories, the weakest case that a prosecutor or
victim might conceivably win under existing law and social conventions
becomes the "close case." Their absence also sets the boundaries of "Not
True" and "So What" at places that exclude much behavior that the law
should deter. As a result, anything a man does that is not legal rape or
sexual harassment becomes simply "sex" or "flirting." 134
Finally, story telling allows us to explore the complex gray area
between sexual violation and sexual pleasure. As part of the long-term
struggle for understanding and transformation, we need to examine our
own experiences of sexuality and the social and psychological dynamics of
those experiences. The world is not divided neatly into good sex, on the
one hand, and rape and violation on the other. There are situations that fit
into neither category: endured sex; "bad" sex; degrading, unpleasant, and
offensive encounters; sex when one participant wants to please the other or
is willing to tolerate sex for the partner's good qualities. 135  Women
need to explore the full range of arguably sexual activities and their
reactions to them. For instance, a woman may say "no," but mean, "not
yet; I'm not sure; let's keep talking." When sex then occurs, it is still
desired despite the initial "no." Conversely, a woman may say "yes" to
please a man or avoid an anticipated argument, though she did not want
sex. 136  The last category of stories in which "no" sometimes does not
134. The easy slippage from "not rape" to "just sex" is akin to the apparent rule that one is fit
for public office if "not indicted."
135. Lynne Henderson is the pioneer in the exploration of these various points along a proposed
continuum between rape and pleasurable heterosexuality. See Henderson, supra note 128, at 57-63,
73 ("While some writers have posited a continuum between rape and heterosexual intercourse, none
to my knowledge has attempted to describe what the continuum between rape and pleasurable
heterosexuality might be"); see also Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Noles for a Radical Theory of the
Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANaER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY, supra note 1,
at 267 (discussing more generally the sexual continuum).
136. These hypothetical explorations of language should not provide any basis for doubting that
something like "no means no" is the right legal rule. First, cases in which a woman falsely claims
rape based on nothing more than a "no" which was really a "maybe" are as scarce as the proverbial
hen's teeth. Second, a rule that allows a jury to acquit in the face of the woman's 'no" is to invite
the condemnation of certain women based on rape myths. See, e.g., People v. Burnham, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 630, 635, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th 1986) (holding as reversible error failure to give mistake of
fact instruction, in addition to instruction on consent, where wife was severely beaten and then
subjected to acts of sexual intercourse and attempted penetration by canine penis); People v.
Thompson, 324 N.W.2d 22, 23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (requiring consent defense instruction for
alleged rape since court was 'not persuaded that consensual sexual intercourse is necessarily
impossible in the course of a kidnapping"); Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal
Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 835-43 (1988) (proposing a victim-oriented
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mean "no" can be misused or misunderstood. Although we may want to
be careful where and to whom we tell these stories, we must find a place
for these conversations in which we can examine our understandings of the
boundaries of pleasure and danger. 137
In the hope of inspiring others, let me provide two examples of stories
and their uses. First, consider the Glen Ridge case, in which several high
school athletes were convicted of sexual assault on a young woman with
"an I.Q. of 64 and the social acuity of an 8-year old." 138  The acts of
sexual violation, including oral sex, fondling, and the insertion of various
implements into the woman's vagina, were undisputed. The defendants
claimed that all of these activities were consensual, though nothing in the
testimony suggested that the activities reflected mutual sexual pleasure.
Rather, the victim explained that she participated because "'I didn't want
to hurt their feelings,' [and because] she had been told that one of the
youths would ask her out on a date if she did as they asked." 13 9 He did
not. The legal issue revolved around her capacity to consent. The State
asserted that any acquiescence was legally irrelevant, because she did not
realize that she could say "no." The trial and the reporting of it provided
a compelling introduction to a discussion of what consent means and what
sexual experiences society values. I suggest that the woman's willingness
to endure sex in order to please men, or in hopes of romance and human
recognition, are widely shared, even though this particular woman may
conception of mutuality whereby the welcome character of the sexual act is determined by asking
the question of whether the target would have initiated the encounter had she been given a choice);
Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217, 217-43 (1989) (explaining how
the mythology surrounding rape enters into a criterion of reasonableness which operates through the
legal system to make women vulnerable to unscrupulous victimization). But see Steven B. Katz,
Liberal Feminism and the Politics of Rape, 24 AM. CRIM. L. R-v. 1007, 1015 (1987) (book review)
("At some point, consent-acts can be so ambiguous that it is not fair to inculpate the accused, even
if we have every reason to believe the complainant was truly not willing to engage in sex.");
Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 15, at 874 (finding that women do sometimes say no and
not mean it or they put up a token resistance). These comments mean only that a truly effective "no
means no" rape law would put a crimp in the sexual styles of some women as well as some men.
Given the relative costs of forced sex and forced clarification of your wishes and those of your
partner, the legal rule ought to make it dangerous to ignore a woman's "no."
Similarly, we should formalize rules about sexual harassment in a way that conceptually
includes "the games, intrigue, nuances and fun of flirting." In effect, where boundaries of the
permissible are culturally contested, doctrine should empower the less powerful party by giving her
"no" the force of law. But see Susan J. McCarthy, Cultural Fascism, FORBEs, Dec. 9, 1991, at 116
(condemning such a broadening of sexual harassment law's proscriptions).
137. By telling these stories, we can transcend the dilemma of telling stories that are not true
or that cannot be heard. "If women are taught to lie to men and to themselves about the existence
of pain... how are we to use their experience of pleasure in pain as a basis for feminist theory?"
Whitman, supra note 33, at 498-99.
138. Jane Fritsch, Debating Whether 'Yes' Means 'No,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at A49.
139. Id. at A58; see also Anna Quindlen, 21 Going on 6, N.Y. TtMEs, Dec. 13, 1992, §4, at
17 (summarizing the victim's explanation of what happened and why she participated).
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have lacked the normal capacity to judge the value of her bargain. The
story ultimately horrifies and instructs us by its ordinariness-it encourages
conversations acknowledging and exploring these reactions.
Second, I have a story of my own that I sometimes use in the
classroom and in personal conversation that straddles the boundaries of
legal and merely experiential sexual violation. When I tell it in the
classroom, it is as the "hypothetical" scenario of sexually harassing
behavior by the senior partner, Max, toward the young associate, Susan.
Max and Susan were out of town on firm business, together with
several other colleagues. Max sat next to Susan at dinner. During dinner
and during the drinks that followed (heavy drinking was part of the firm
culture), they discussed the case. Susan was quietly ecstatic at the
opportunity to talk about theories of the case and litigation strategy with
such a senior attorney. Discussion drifted to gossip about the firm, to law
generally, popular culture, this and that. As the conversation continued,
they walked back towards his hotel room and across the threshold. She
stepped inside, for they were in the midst of a conversation. Then he
stepped around her and latched the door. He lay down on the bed, took
her wrist, and invited her to join him there.
At that point, I break off the story and ask the students for their
response: Is it harassment? What should she do? Inevitably, some
students are quick to notice both the awkwardness of her situation and her
foolishness in letting it happen. Only then do I identify myself as Susan.
Students' perceptions of my credibility validate the story; the structure of
the exercise allows them to perceive and respond to its complexities and
ambiguities.
It is not clear that this situation would be actionable as sexual
harassment, even if the fact finder believed Susan's description of the
incident. On the one hand, she avoided the sexual invitation by pleading
a failure of nerve and left the firm shortly thereafter. A lawsuit might have
exposed the fact that she was a sexually active divorced woman and had
had a brief, consensual affair with a married professor a few years
previously, which invites a reinforcement of rape myths. On the other
hand, a lawsuit would have shown Max's sexually aggressive propensities
and that they were common knowledge around the firm.140  Like his
other targets, I never officially complained. 1
41
140. When I finally overcame my embarrassment about my experience with Max and told one
of the other women at the firm, her response horrified me: "Oh, didn't anyone warn you? Max pulls
stunts like that all the time."
141. 1 had little to gain and much at risk given the discretionary nature of associate reviews and
recommendations to future employers. Like Anita Hill, "Perhaps I should have taken angry or even
militant steps . . . . But . . . the course that I took seemed the better as well as the .easier
approach." Hill Statement, supra note 59, at 21.
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The incident, honestly examined, raises deeper ambiguities of fact and
norm. My response of dismay and disgust was not without a soupgon of
pleasure that someone of Max's stature and genuine charm had-I
thought-chosen me for his overtures.142  I also blamed myself for
allowing the incident to progress that far. 143 I was certain I could have
handled the situation more gracefully had I not had so much to drink. I
felt both pleased and angry with myself for a response that got me out of
the room without placing any blame on Max for his attempt. Like the
Glen Ridge woman, and like so many of us so often, I had no sexual desire
for what was invited. But my life was not neatly divided into sexual and
non-sexual realms. And what made this invitation coercive and offensive
could not be neatly encapsulated.
IV. Conclusion
Storytelling serves in numerous ways to maximize women's protection
from sexual exploitation without jettisoning women's sexual pleasure. In
some contexts, storytelling reinforces the substantive and procedural law
reforms that feminist lawyers and others helped to institute in the last
decades. These reforms redefine sexual assault to include more instances
of clearly unwanted sex and provide the doctrinal and theoretical basis for
an expanding recognition of sexual harassment as a legally cognizable
harm. They make it easier for women to come forward because they
reduce the arsenal police and hostile attorneys have traditionally used to
attack the credibility and character of women who make such complaints.
All these reforms inevitably leave crucial issues to the determination
of the fact finders: Is she telling the truth? Would he have behaved that
way? Does the law make that behavior tortious or criminal? In making
those decisions, the fact finders will frequently view the evidence through
the lens of their assumptions about sexuality and work, men and women,
142. See Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt: Treatment of Sex
and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1367, 1374 (1992) ("Although it is
false, the (usually) unspoken message is that only a 'desirable' woman will be harassed. Ironically,
as women seek to make themselves desirable to men, they are blamed for male response.") (citations
omitted).
143. We must distinguish between the criteria we use in setting legal norms and in organizing
our own lives and advising others how to act in a world of sexual danger. We use the language of
responsibility in the latter realms, in an effort to increase control over our lives. Would even the
most firmly feminist mother not advise her daughter to avoid such danger-fraught situations as
alcohol-soaked fraternity parties? Yet she will still insist on the man's responsibility and the right
to a legal remedy when a woman has misread the signals or taken a chance. But see PAOLIA, supra
note 97, at 69 ("[]f you drink a certain number of drinks and behave in a certain way and go to a
man's room alone-I believe it's time to take the Sixties attitude toward that; that is, you are
consenting to sex").
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good women and bad women. Changing those assumptions is thus a
crucial additional element in the task of legally protecting women.
Storytelling outside the courts is a vital means of exploding rape myths and
creating a population of potential fact finders more inclined to believe the
stories of those women who do go to court for redress of a sexual
violation.
Storytelling can also educate. Redress for sexual violations is, though
necessary, a poor second choice to the elimination of such activities. As
we tell stories of our experiences and our feelings of having been sexually
violated, men-even Maxes-may begin to view their behaviors through the
eyes of women and perhaps, to change them; while women may develop
a richer understanding of what we do, how our behavior might be
understood, and finally, what we really want.
Narratives, for the variety of reasons detailed above, are not a
sufficient solution to the problems of sexual violation. In conjunction with
legal reform, education, and institutional change, however, they can bring
us closer to the day when sexuality is pleasure and play, not danger and
degradation, for women and men.
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